Re: The "korean bank" use-case

On 28 Nov 2011, at 04:20, Anders Rundgren wrote:

> AFAICT, this is essentially an improved version of Mozilla's current
> JS crypto.  That's fine but IMO it doesn't support security HW
> in a way that makes sense to a bank since there is no way you can
> assure that keys are stored in HW or SW.

How can you •assure• that in the first place? Surely you’re always just taking the interface’s word for it, even if it claims to provide such guarantees?

>From a security perspective, don’t any claims as to the storage mechanisms employed by the consumer-side hardware and software fall into the “untrusted inputs” category?

M.

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Received on Monday, 28 November 2011 09:02:40 UTC