[Bug 26401] Key message destinationURL usage is not reflected in examples

https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26401

--- Comment #9 from Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com> ---
To re-iterate what I said on the call: I see legitimate use-cases for the CDM
to supply routing information along with the message. If we don't provide an
explicit field for this CDMs will just redefine their message format to be a (
routing, message ) pair.

I don't see how we could ban CDMs from basing this routing information in part
on information in the initData.

The question of the security of the initData is a general one. Keysystem
designs need to consider the security implications of using this information.
Obviously, the security considerations for information that might influence
message routing is different from that for information which might only
influence message contents, since you could cause the message not to be sent to
the expected place. That is, an attack on the message contents could be
mitigated at the server, but an attack on the message routing cannot, because
the server might never see the message.

Perhaps we need some information in the security considerations about the need
to protect initData ?

As far as this bug goes, we should avoid showing an example with a security
hole, so perhaps the example should mention that the CDM needs to have
validated the URL or even show the page validating the URL ?

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Received on Tuesday, 26 August 2014 17:19:02 UTC