- From: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 04:54:25 +0000
- To: Jeff Gilbert <jgilbert@mozilla.com>, JF Bastien <w3c@jfbastien.com>
- Cc: public-gpu@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CANxMeyDuCySRuS=yFxUUKhk3i7Oft_NFSMcsMOrL6kdnGx188g@mail.gmail.com>
It was discussed on the call today that logical addressing mode could be too restrictive for some applications. We did not determine whether it is or not; there is an action item to do research into real-world GPU compute applications (e.g. in MSL, CUDA, OpenCL) and how they use pointer addressing features so we can make an informed decision. On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 9:51 PM Jeff Gilbert <jgilbert@mozilla.com> wrote: > Where does the proposal of non-logical-addressing spirv come from? My > understanding is that Vulkan requires logical addressing only. > > On Aug 24, 2017 12:22 AM, "JF Bastien" <w3c@jfbastien.com> wrote: > >> On Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 9:00 PM, Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Aug 23, 2017, at 8:46 PM, Kai Ninomiya <kainino@google.com> wrote: >>> >>> As was mentioned in today's call, there may or may not be agreement on >>> what is required of our security model. >>> >>> As a first step I want to make sure agree on a *lower bound* on the >>> strictness of the security model before we go into debates about further >>> restrictions. My understanding: >>> >>> * Any memory or data access of any kind MUST NOT make data visible to >>> the Application other than (a) default values or (b) any data produced by >>> the program. >>> >>> >>> Can you define your terms a bit more? What specifically do "the >>> Application" and "the program" mean in this case? Do these terms refer to >>> the same thing? Do they refer to just the shader program or the combination >>> of all shader programs plus the webpage (or other CPU-level application) >>> invoking them? >>> >>> At first glance your point seemed clear, but then I thought about what >>> it means for textures. Clearly shaders should be allowed to access the >>> contents of textures provided to them. But are those either "default >>> values" or "values produced by the program"? It depends on what "program" >>> means. >>> >> >> I think you also want to define what functions are allowed to do: >> >> - Can I read the executable code? >> - Can I direct-call a function with mismatched argument count / >> return count? >> - Can I indirect-call a function with mismatched argument count / >> return count? >> - Can I imbalance the data stack (pop more than I've pushed)? >> - Can I call arbitrary addresses, or overwrite a return address? >> - Is recursion allowed, and is it bounded? >> >> IIUC most GPU programs have perfect call information when compiled, so I >> could theoretically inline everything? If our languages enforces this then >> we're significantly simplifying the problem. >> >> You also want to specify how calls into and out of WebGPU work. >> WebAssembly calls this interaction with the "embedder". For example, in a >> JavaScript embedding you can't use i64 in your interface. There currently >> aren't any races possible, but I think WebGPU has to put extra thought into >> this to avoid ToCToU headaches while minimizing copying. >> >> >> * This must be implementable in a performant way on all current, existing >>> target platforms. (Platform-specific optimizations like robustness >>> guarantees or page table controls optional.) >>> >>> >> What are "all" platforms? WebAssembly limits itself to a set of portable >> targets >> <https://github.com/WebAssembly/design/blob/master/Portability.md>. >> Others can implement WebAssembly but will suffer a mild performance loss. >> >> >> I think the lower bound needs to include the constraints for writing as >>> well, not just reading. I'd hope there is consensus on this, though I was >>> not on the call. >>> >> >> Yes, writing as well :) >> >> >> >>> Also, these constraints must hold for the combination of the shader >>> language and the API itself. Races between the CPU and the GPU must not >>> allow memory safety constraints to be violated. >>> >>> >>> Beyond that, I'd like to figure out how to break down the discussion >>> before moving forward. Example questions (but I don't want to discuss these >>> questions YET): >>> >>> >>> I am so tempted to answer these questions, but refraining for now. >>> >>> >>> * Do we want fully general pointer behavior, the SPIR-V restricted >>> pointer behavior mentioned today, logical addressing only, or something >>> else? What high-level language features, algorithms, and techniques might >>> require more flexibility? >>> >>> >>> * Is it possible to provide any kind of "fault" behavior? - e.g., >>> termination of execution in such a way that IF outside data is accessed by >>> the Device, the Device is terminated before that data can become visible to >>> the Application. If it's possible, is it useful? >>> >>> >>> * Can our security model be "optional" for an insecure-mode, "native" >>> (C/C++) version of the API? (Useful for native platform portability as well >>> as apps with both native and web versions.) >>> >>> >> WebAssembly just says that such implementations are non-conforming. You >> can still do it, we don't have a trademark enforcing conformance. Keeps the >> spec simple. >> >> >> What other questions can we add to this list? >>> >>> >> More questions: >> >> *Fault ordering.* We discussed whether fault behavior should be >> guaranteed to happen in program order or not. Fil gave the example of >> WebAssembly where that's the case, but with multiple warps going I'm not >> sure it's reasonably feasible. I don't want us to explore feasibility now, >> just adding that question to the list, let's figure it out later. >> >> *Nondeterminism.* Another question is whether you want full determinism >> on corner cases or not. WebAssembly clamps it down substantially >> <https://github.com/WebAssembly/design/blob/master/Nondeterminism.md>. >> You might even choose to leave it implementation-defined what happens on an >> out of bounds memory access: an implementation could be allowed to >> terminate *or* wrap around. I'm not advocating either way, just adding >> more to the design space. You'll definitely want to figure out how to >> resolve races in the face of threads and SIMD (not mandate a single >> outcome, but have some memory model). >> >>
Attachments
- application/pkcs7-signature attachment: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Received on Thursday, 24 August 2017 04:54:59 UTC