- From: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 03:46:42 +0000
- To: "public-gpu@w3.org" <public-gpu@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANxMeyA7URKA2PxgNuvBBcnUYpzfuyc9fwcm9pvX8tgzPTS-pQ@mail.gmail.com>
As was mentioned in today's call, there may or may not be agreement on what is required of our security model. As a first step I want to make sure agree on a *lower bound* on the strictness of the security model before we go into debates about further restrictions. My understanding: * Any memory or data access of any kind MUST NOT make data visible to the Application other than (a) default values or (b) any data produced by the program. * This must be implementable in a performant way on all current, existing target platforms. (Platform-specific optimizations like robustness guarantees or page table controls optional.) Beyond that, I'd like to figure out how to break down the discussion before moving forward. Example questions (but I don't want to discuss these questions YET): * Do we want fully general pointer behavior, the SPIR-V restricted pointer behavior mentioned today, logical addressing only, or something else? What high-level language features, algorithms, and techniques might require more flexibility? * Is it possible to provide any kind of "fault" behavior? - e.g., termination of execution in such a way that IF outside data is accessed by the Device, the Device is terminated before that data can become visible to the Application. If it's possible, is it useful? * Can our security model be "optional" for an insecure-mode, "native" (C/C++) version of the API? (Useful for native platform portability as well as apps with both native and web versions.) What other questions can we add to this list? -Kai
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Received on Thursday, 24 August 2017 03:47:16 UTC