- From: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
- Date: Mon, 14 Jun 2010 11:35:48 -0700
- To: Jonas Sicking <jonas@sicking.cc>
- Cc: Web Applications Working Group WG <public-webapps@w3.org>, public-device-apis <public-device-apis@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <AANLkTinS5LW4fVSNQMomxzSkatjh4eFSnOSH9nVMxH-i@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jun 14, 2010 at 12:40 AM, Jonas Sicking <jonas@sicking.cc> wrote: > On Sun, Jun 13, 2010 at 10:46 PM, Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> > wrote: > > Why do the "filedata:" URLs need to apply a same-origin check? It seems > > like this would unnecessarily reduce composability. In practice, the > URLs > > returned by the File API would be unguessable anyway. Why not use > > unguessability of these tokens as the security mechanism? So if a web > app > > wants to share the file with other, co-operating entities (e.g. in an > iframe > > or another tab), it can do so by sharing the URL; otherwise, it can > withhold > > the URL. > > > > When would the currently-proposed same-origin checks apply? Would I be > > right in thinking that they only apply to XMLHttpRequests from > Javascript, > > and don't apply if the URL is linked from an <img> element? > > URLs weren't always designed to be security sensitive. One common way > they leak is through the "referer" (sic) header. So if the File whose > .url you were loading was an HTML file, and you loaded it using an > <iframe>, you could very easily leak the URL to untrusted parties. > That's true for "http:" URLs, but AFAIK it's not true for "https:" URLs. The browser is not supposed to disclose HTTPS URLs via the Referer header, and I know of at least one app (Tahoe-LAFS) that relies on that. Since the File API is creating the new "filedata:" URL scheme, it can specify that it has the same property. > At the very least the same-origin check applies such that if a > cross-origin file uri is used on <img>, this would be considered a > cross-origin load if that <img> was later pasted into a <canvas>. > Similarly, if a cross-origin <video> is loaded, I think some events > are with-held, though I'm less sure about that. > > However, in firefox we've taken a more strict approach. We disallow > cross-origin <img> loads for filedata URIs. I.e. if site A receives a > File with a url. Then even if site B manages to get hold of that url, > it can't use <img> to load it. > This is adding a new mechanism, isn't it, since <img> was previously considered to be normal linking and did not have a same-origin check. What would happen if a page has an <a href="filedata:..."> link? Regards, Mark
Received on Monday, 14 June 2010 18:36:28 UTC