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RE: Security evaluation of an example DAP policy

From: Marcin Hanclik <Marcin.Hanclik@access-company.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2009 09:50:28 +0100
To: Jonas Sicking <jonas@sicking.cc>
CC: Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com>, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>, Robin Berjon <robin@berjon.com>, "public-device-apis@w3.org" <public-device-apis@w3.org>, public-webapps WG <public-webapps@w3.org>
Message-ID: <FAA1D89C5BAF1142A74AF116630A9F2C28942D75F1@OBEEX01.obe.access-company.com>
Hi Jonas,

Thanks for your comments.

The below policy actually blocks access to all device APIs for all websites (up to bugs in the RE, now I think it should be /.*/ instead of /.+/), thus actually expresses the currently applied policy available in the browsers. I.e. it already works to some extent :)

I assume the clear arguments raised in this mail thread will be very helpful for DAP and BONDI.

Handling data exchange between scripts and OS via <input> element with explicit user consent is another paradigm that I believe will be explored.
We could think of some mapping of the APIs from/to <input> to be able to realize functionally same scenarios with minimal change of the code.
E.g. <input type="contact"> would be a kind of equivalent to addressbook.getContact() or so.
The differentiation could be as above, but the properties of the objects retrieved by both above scenarios could match for easy integration. Personally I perceive it as a design pattern.


Marcin Hanclik
ACCESS Systems Germany GmbH
Tel: +49-208-8290-6452  |  Fax: +49-208-8290-6465
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E-Mail: marcin.hanclik@access-company.com

-----Original Message-----
From: Jonas Sicking [mailto:jonas@sicking.cc]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2009 2:04 AM
To: Marcin Hanclik
Cc: Maciej Stachowiak; Adam Barth; Robin Berjon; public-device-apis@w3.org; public-webapps WG
Subject: Re: Security evaluation of an example DAP policy

On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 4:49 PM, Marcin Hanclik
<Marcin.Hanclik@access-company.com> wrote:
> Hi Jonas, Maciej,
> It seems that the policy that you would accept would be:
> <policy-set combine="deny-overrides">
>  <policy description="Default Policy for websites. Simply denying all API that are covered by some device capability:) ">
>   <target>
>     <subject>
>       <subject-match attr="class" match="website" func="equal"/>
>     </subject>
>   </target>
>   <rule effect="deny">
>     <condition>
>       <resource-match attr="device-cap" func="regexp">/.+/</resource-match>
>     </condition>
>   </rule>
>  </policy>
> </policy-set>
> Let's see how DAP will evolve then.

Given that I don't know the specifics about this policy format I can't
comment on the above policy specifically. However I will note that the
security experts at Mozilla did agree that opening a non-modal dialog
asking for access to geo-location was considered acceptable, as I
noted in a previous email. I don't know what effect that has on the
above policy.

I don't know what policy other browsers have used in this area.

/ Jonas


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Received on Friday, 20 November 2009 08:51:19 UTC

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