- From: David Rogers <david.rogers@omtp.org>
- Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 10:41:09 -0000
- To: "Maciej Stachowiak" <mjs@apple.com>, "Frederick Hirsch" <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>
- Cc: "ext Jonas Sicking" <jonas@sicking.cc>, "Marcin Hanclik" <Marcin.Hanclik@access-company.com>, "Dominique Hazael-Massieux" <dom@w3.org>, "Robin Berjon" <robin@berjon.com>, <public-device-apis@w3.org>, "public-webapps WG" <public-webapps@w3.org>
Hi, I'm going to answer these one by one, so apologies in advance for a slew of emails coming from me. My comments will always be marked [DAVID]: -----Original Message----- From: Maciej Stachowiak [mailto:mjs@apple.com] Sent: 19 November 2009 01:20 To: Frederick Hirsch Cc: ext Jonas Sicking; David Rogers; Marcin Hanclik; Dominique Hazael-Massieux; Robin Berjon; public-device-apis@w3.org; public-webapps WG Subject: Re: DAP and security (was: Rename "File API" to "FileReader API"?) On Nov 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Frederick Hirsch wrote: > This is a good point, and an argument for "policy" rather than > implicit user consent, if I'm not mistaken. It highlights that > usability might also be an issue with the non-modal interaction > model, as well as not always be very meaningful (since I the user > might have no idea what most directories are for or where to > navigate). Arbitrary directory navigation for writing files is not a > good idea. "policy" is not a solution to the scenario Jonas posted either. Who is going to define a home PC or Mac user's browser policy? The user doesn't have the expertise to do it. There's no sysadmin to do it for them. And browser/OS vendors should not be in the game of whitelisting a specific set of sites for extra access. [DAVID] This is the whole point - the user could choose who their policy provider could be. The list is endless but it could be: a child protection organisation, EFF, Which?, an anti-virus vendor/firewall company, OS vendor, browser vendor, mobile operator - the point being that the provider is someone the user trusts. On the subject of whitelisting etc. have a look at http://stopbadware.org/ - potentially these are things that could be used by policy providers (I'm sure there are lots of other reputable sources too). Dieter Gollman said: "security-unaware users have specific security requirements but usually no security expertise" - this is why is wholly irresponsible to defer the decision to the user in the majority of cases. Generally, the user would much rather have someone more informed take that decision for them. I don't think we can eliminate prompts but we could reduce them to a level that they might actually be read and treated as important. Right now the opposite is true. Thanks, David.
Received on Thursday, 19 November 2009 10:42:14 UTC