Re: Woleet presentation

I'm still a bit confused. Are you suggesting that you use a bitcoin private
key to enter a transaction into the blockchain, and a secondary identity
key to sign that data for identification purposes? If so, I don't think
there's any added security to that system given two private keys....

You could probably use standard PKI certificate assignment conventions
<http://t.sidekickopen68.com/e1t/c/5/f18dQhb0S7lC8dDMPbW2n0x6l2B9nMJW7t5XZs64QWBnN65jGYzdDM0TW3Mqkws56dTD4f5BDvV602?t=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.digicert.com%2Fsha-2-ssl-certificates.htm&si=5552757960605696&pi=b126ab1f-59df-4a64-c0df-83d21bacdeea>
to maintain an identity, and couple that with revocating features, all
while using only a single bitcoin private key to sign transactions.

If your key is compromised, I don't think there's much you can do about it
outside a CRL framework.

While HD keys are certainly cool, I don't think there's an efficiency here,
since the HD root key would likely be the one that's compromised...

On Mon, Nov 28, 2016 at 11:54 PM, Wayne Vaughan <wayne@tierion.com> wrote:

> Chris,
>
> Signing with a private key proves that the data was signed with that key.
> If the key is tied to a registry of identity information with sufficient
> attestations, you can prove the identity of the signer.  However, if the
> key is compromised, a modified version of the data could be signed and
> you'd have no way of telling which is the correct copy. If you sign and
> anchor the data to the Bitcoin blockchain, you now have a proof that can't
> be replicated without altering the blockchain.  A Chainpoint proof also
> gives you an approximate timestamp for the publication of the data. You can
> also do some neat tricks with hierarchal deterministic keys to prove that a
> collection of signed items are related.
>
>
>