Re: Consideration about prevention of Low Level I/F APIs being executed by mistake

On Thu, Nov 12, 2015, at 03:53, Satoru Takagi wrote:
> Therefore we imagine the other method as follows:
> 
> It is an execution limitation function of API similar to same origin
> policy combining an identifier with a meaning 
> such as window.navigator.userAgent.

So this is just an identifier for a particular hardware setup, right?

> *The developers make the identifier by the URL corresponding to each
> machine which they have created. The URL may 
> have Web of the explanation about the machine. But it is only a URL that
> is necessary in this mechanism.
> 
> *The developers set the URL to window.navigator.userAgent-like readonly
> attribute of the web runtime embedded in 
> that machine. This setting should be set as runtime environment.

> *Low level APIs such as webIGPIO or webI2C shall work only in application
> software to belong to a domain same as 
> that URL attribute, unless special setting such as CORS is accomplished.

So this ties a particular hardware setup to a unique origin?

This origin would then act like a directory of authorized applications
by opening them up through CORS. That seems like a very centralized
solution.

I feel like a solution similar to how you say USB or Bluetooth works
might be harder to organize but end up providing a more open (and thus
more successful) solution.

Best,

--tobie

Received on Tuesday, 17 November 2015 21:51:15 UTC