- From: Eduardo Casais <casays@yahoo.com>
- Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 01:36:54 -0800 (PST)
- To: public-bpwg-ct@w3.org
a) no-transform Section 4.2.8.2 states: "Servers can prevent users from exercising this choice by applying a Cache-Control: no-transform directive." This is inexact: a no-transform directive exactly means that the response sent by the server must not be modified. It has no bearing on the SSL/TLS setup. It does not apply to previous HTTP exchanges that might have led to https URL rewriting. In other words, it is not the right mechanism to prevent breaking a secure connection, or to signal a refusal to handle point-to-point connections instead of end-to-end ones -- except by widely stretching its signification outside the specifications of RFC2616. b) Connection setup This is something that has been already stated by several commentators: a response with the cache-control directive comes too late. By that time, the secure connection is already interrupted at the proxy level. Consider the following example: 1. Client accesses a page with a list of links (e.g. from a web directory), one of them is an https URL. 2. The page gets transcoded, the https URL rewritten. 3. Client access rewritten URL. 4. Server gets rewritten https request and responds. At (4), a no-transform directive will only ensure that the content will not get transformed further. If the page only contains relative URL, there is a possibility that the exchange may continue over the broken secure connection, as the base URL on the client side may be taken as the rewritten URL. At this stage, there is no guarantee that the connection may actually be secure, even for further exchanges specifying no-transform. The most probable behaviour of a server under these circumstances is to return the code 403. c) Signalling with the server The correct approach is to enable the server to distinguish whether the secure connection is end-to-end or point-to-point. Somebody familiar with the details of SSL/TLS may suggest something at this level. Otherwise, the necessity of including a reliable, mandatory marker of transcoder presence in the HTTP header is once again evident. E.Casais
Received on Tuesday, 11 November 2008 09:38:09 UTC