- From: Jonathan Rees <jar@creativecommons.org>
- Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2009 18:37:18 -0400
- To: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@ibiblio.org>
- Cc: AWWSW TF <public-awwsw@w3.org>
On Mon, Jun 29, 2009 at 5:52 PM, Harry Halpin<hhalpin@ibiblio.org> wrote: > The reason I think the ontology is so big is that in general, the > issue with lots of these specs (URI specs, especially those mentioning > "conceptual mapping", even bits of Fielding's thesis, and even the > HTTP specs) is that modelling the entire spec is a bit difficult, as > the specs were written relatively informally. No this isn't the reason. The reason is that I want to put all definitions together in a single picture, to make it easier to choose between them. So ultimately it has to do not with a large number of things or parts, but with a large number of distinct definitions from many specs that must be consciously either discounted or reconciled. I don't want to make yet another new theory of everything; that would be too easy and would not help with integration and conflict resolution. I want to pick and choose from what's already present. As I have said before the final ontology will be much crisper - we agree on this - but no crisper than is correct. Another purpose in making all those boxes at the top is to put in everyone's face what an embarrassment this is. So I will fight any suggestion that this ontology is a "proposal". My comment about you thinking representations are ephemeral comes from your IRW ontology: "The realization of a message encoding that 'goes on the wire' according to an interaction protocol (e.g. http) in order to resolve a Web accessible resource." which I misinterpreted as saying that they only go on the wire and not elsewhere. Sorry about that. Maybe you could clarify what's meant by "realization" (I thought have that would be: "made real" or "made physical") so I don't get misled next time I come across this. What's the difference between a message encoding and a realization of it? Note that in HTTP, representations (which are entities) are subject to a transfer-encoding, so what goes on the wire is actually an encoding of an entity, not the entity itself. The entity body itself has a content-transfer-encoding applied to it, and is in turn sometimes subject to a character encoding. Then the characters may encode yet another thing, via application of the content-type, and so on... so "encoding" is a slippery and prolific relationship, and piling "realization", which sounds like another kind of encoding, on top of the stack doesn't seem to shed much light. Regarding equivalence of distinct entities -- well, the generic resource theory already *is* a theory of equivalence - at each time a generic resource has a set of equivalent representations. If it has to be built on another theory that needs its own notion of equivalence that would be a failure. Better to just build genont on a theoriy of things (representations) that are adequate to capture, in their own identities, the foundation needed to explain "fixed", so that you can effectively leverage intuition, ordinary language, model theory and inference and not repeat have to repeat equality at an intermediate level of the ontological tower, so to speak. (Assuming we want to pursue genont and equivalence theories at all, that is.) Requiring an equivalence theory for almost *any* class seems to me a failure to find the right thing (ontologically speaking) to which each equivalence class would correspond. Best Jonathan
Received on Monday, 29 June 2009 22:37:59 UTC