- From: Anne van Kesteren <annevk@opera.com>
- Date: Wed, 12 Dec 2007 17:38:55 +0100
- To: "Williams, Stuart (HP Labs, Bristol)" <skw@hp.com>, "public-appformats@w3.org" <public-appformats@w3.org>
On Wed, 12 Dec 2007 17:25:02 +0100, Williams, Stuart (HP Labs, Bristol)
<skw@hp.com> wrote:
>> Security trumps purity. Not sure what else to say here.
>
> I think that's just a little too pithy! Corner cases are juts tricky to
> get right and A trumps B doesn't really cut it IMO - plus I think it's
> pretty to hard to make a hard security based argument - that information
> left the origin server, it passed through numerous wires, probably in
> clear, along with the access control headers (visible), through who
> knows how many proxies that could 'fiddle' with them - do you
> authenticate the access control headers (they can certainly be tampered
> with)? should you?
The information could be behind an authenticated page protected using TLS
or something in that direction.
>> I think there are some problems with introducing the same
>> algorithm non-normatively in a contrain-based style:
>>
>> 1. There might be differences
>> 2. It might confuse implementors
>
> What I offered doesn't present an algorithm, it was an attempt to say,
> explicitly, what the algorithm is intended to accomplish ('what' rather
> than 'how').
>
> The algorithm "does what it does" is hardly a good basis on which to
> review the spec.
I think we disagree on that.
>>> Provided the algorithm is correct (ie. does what it's supposed to do)
>>> then the imperative statement of the algorithm is indeed one way of
>>> stating (implicitly) what it does. But how are we to tell if it's
>>> correct if we don't say what it's supposed to do?
>>
>> I think that's the wrong way of looking at it. You want to
>> look if for a certain (evil) input A the results of the
>> algorithm are not desirable.
>
> Well, if you don't say what the algorithm is supposed to accomplish...
> no-one can review the spec for the correctness of the algorithm!
The algorithm is supposed to introduce no new security problems while
allowing cross-site access and manipulation of representations of
resources.
> Best they can says is... "well it does what it does". Maybe there's a
> requirements document or a design document that captures what the
> algorithm is required to do which reviewers should be reviewing the
> document against?
There is no such document.
--
Anne van Kesteren
<http://annevankesteren.nl/>
<http://www.opera.com/>
Received on Wednesday, 12 December 2007 16:37:54 UTC