- From: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 18:57:25 -0700
- To: ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com>
- Cc: public-agentprotocol <public-agentprotocol@w3.org>, Lars Kersten Kroehl <lars@moltrust.ch>, llewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com>, tima <tima@aeoess.com>
- Message-ID: <CANpA1Z2SOJKy9A7XXC_zk+diuF7Qbeic1BnhoKF7UGuwvzEuUg@mail.gmail.com>
LLMs ability to deal with natural language presents an opportunity to avoid defining standards for expressing policy or even the reason for rejection. Will it work? I have no idea, but I think it's an idea worth exploring. -------------- Alan Karp On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 6:15 PM ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com> wrote: > *HI, Alan, colleagues,* > > You are right, and the gap is real: we know of no deployed system that > carries the delegator's standing policy — your "Please" — as data a relying > party could read. It is worth saying plainly that our schemes do not fill > that slot either, and that the omission is deliberate. > > The refusal reason field of Section 8 of our draft > (draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing, the series currently under ISE review) is a > closed five-value set with a fixed priority order, and every value in it is > an authority fact: the evidence did not match, the evidence expired, the > authority could not be determined, the authority was revoked, the operation > is not permitted. "Only within the company" is not an authority fact; it is > a term of the grant or a preference of the delegator. The draft applies the > same rule to policy text that it applies to action verbs — "this document > deliberately defines no enumeration of verbs, because enumerating an open > set would close it" (Section 7.1.1 of the same draft). A standard > vocabulary of "Please"s would be closed by exactly the act of standardizing > the ones we happened to think of first. > > The place for the "Please" exists one layer up, in composing artifacts > rather than in the verification answer. An authorization envelope carries > the mandate — what the agent is asked to do, under what constraints, for > how long; the Agent Authorization Envelope draft already circulating in > this group is one such container, and revision -01 of our draft, posted 27 > October, states the composition in its Section 12: an authorization > envelope can name actions on rttp-addressed subjects and cite iqa > attestations as evidence, and neither depends on the other. The > verification answer stays small on purpose: whether the claimant stands, > and which grant the answer relied on. > > Your credential-sharing argument is, we think, independent support for the > discipline the vocabulary already imposes: implementations MUST NOT emit > values outside the set and MUST NOT reinterpret an emitted value to mean > something else, and "a response that reports an outcome without its reason > is not conformant: the reason is what makes a refusal auditable." An > articulable refusal gives the blocked party something to read and correct; > a silent block gives them something to route around. On that point we are > entirely aligned. > > What no artifact in this thread carries yet — ours included — is the > second slot you named: a standard place for the reason a specific policy > was violated. Policy vocabularies are deployments' own, open-ended, and > belong to the calling layer, the same layer that owns action-time > authorization, which the draft explicitly declines to claim. Naming that as > an open question, the way you just did, is the right first move; > standardizing it would be a larger project than this thread, and we make no > promise about it here. > > One housekeeping note for readers of the thread: the revision under ISE > review is now draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-01 (posted 27 October 2026); the > attestation-response vocabulary of Section 8 is I-D text, and the series > page is https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing/. > > > Best regards, > > Lee > lee@aicent.com > RTTP & IQA Organization > Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing > Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP, CRI 27) > Identity Quality Assurance (IQA, CRI 28) > Sites: https://rttp.com · https://iqa.org > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > From:Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> > Send Time:Wed, Oct 28, 2026, 07:26 > To:ShaoBao Li<lee@aicent.com> > CC:Lars Kersten Kroehl<lars@moltrust.ch>; "public-agentprotocol"< > public-agentprotocol@w3.org>; llewis<llewis@sovrlabs.com>; tima< > tima@aeoess.com> > Subject:Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): > preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity > > Knowing why a request was rejected is useful. More useful is knowing the > policy the delegator would like you to follow, e.g., only within the > company. Most people (and agents) would obey your wishes if only they knew > what they were. I have yet to see a system that has a place to put this > information. > > As an aside, that policy is stated as a "Please." Blocking a delegation > that violates it leads to credential sharing, which means you'd also like a > place to say why the policy is being violated. > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > On Sat, Oct 24, 2026 at 1:00 PM ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com> wrote: > Lars, Tymofii, Larry, colleagues, > > Thank you for the precise answers in your last note; both refinements make > revision 3 concrete, and revision 3 on that basis has our support. > > On the refusal reason: the value that matters is exactly the one you named > — "the authority could not be determined." The fail-closed declaration you > cited earlier in this thread names the behaviour rather than a substantive > refusal, and we agree the result sheet must carry it as a value of its own. > A record that folds unreachability into a substantive reason manufactures > an intent nobody had; keeping the two apart is what makes third-party > recomputation meaningful. > > On the grant reference: naming the grant as it stood at the decision > matches the anchoring our records already use — evidence carries its issue > time, the verifier checks freshness against its own clock, and > recomputation runs against the recorded state, not today's. A grant > narrowed after the fact should not be able to change a recorded verdict; > the format can simply make that impossible. > > Revision 3 is therefore welcome on two fronts: it preserves the > comparability of the frozen revision-2 records — our run and its sealed > artifact stay pinned to the revision-2 digests, as you and Tymofii both > noted — and it adds the two fields that make refusals auditable. When > revision 3 lands, our runner will follow with revision-3 scoring, and the > revision-2 record will stand as it is. > > For the AAE vectors: the candidate route suits us, and we will run them > under the same treatment the lease-revocation family received — > digest-gated, per-mode and per-axis scoring, with the sealed-record format > available if you want an artifact of record. > > One housekeeping note from my post of Sat, 24 Oct 2026 22:44:14 +0800: the > frozen vectors and the run-report format remain available as starting > points for the common set, and the acceptance criteria still seem worth > arguing here on the list rather than settled anywhere else. The offer > stands. > > > Best regards, > Lee > lee@aicent.com > Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (ISE review) > Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP, CRI 27) > Identity Quality Assurance (IQA, CRI 28) > Sites: https://rttp.com · https://iqa.org > Blog: https://blog.aicent.com/ > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > From:Lars Kersten Kroehl <lars@moltrust.ch> > Send Time:Sun, Oct 25, 2026, 00:54 > To:Tymofii Pidlisnyi<tima@aeoess.com> > CC:"public-agentprotocol"<public-agentprotocol@w3.org>; llewis< > llewis@sovrlabs.com>; ShaoBao Li<lee@aicent.com> > Subject:Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): > preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity > > Tymofii, Larry, Lee, > > Tymofii, that would cover both. I would put it like this: The refusal > reason should be able to say that the authority could not be determined — > without that value, an implementation that never reached the source has to > pick the nearest substantive reason, and the record then reads like a > decision someone actually made. > > The grant reference should identify the grant as it stood at the decision. > A grant narrowed afterwards would otherwise recompute to a different answer > than the one recorded, which is an awkward kind of mismatch to chase later. > > Revision 3 on that basis works for me, and thank you for keeping revision > 2 frozen — that keeps the existing runs comparable. > > I will take the candidate route from CONTRIBUTING for the AAE vectors. The > refusal reason also answers the taxonomy question I raised in the issue, > which saves a separate discussion. > > Looking forward to revision 3. > > > Lars > > > Am 24.10.2026 um 17:02 schrieb Tymofii Pidlisnyi <tima@aeoess.com>: > > Lars, Larry, Lee, > > Lars, welcome, and thanks for offering the AAE vectors. > > You're right about refusals. The family reports authority validity > separately, but the action decision only says permit or deny. I propose > adding a refusal reason and the grant reference to each decision record, so > we can compare why implementations refused and which grant they evaluated. > > Would that cover your two points? If so, I'll prepare revision 3 and keep > revision 2 frozen for the existing runs. > > Lars and Larry, vectors from AAE and ATP are welcome as candidates. The > lab publishes a candidate after a short review, before anyone reproduces > it, and admission as a reviewed fixture is a separate step. The route is in > CONTRIBUTING.md at > https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-conformance-suite/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md&source=gmail&ust=1792940577687000&sa=E > > Lee, thanks for the run. I reproduced the #187 output locally and will put > my review on the PR. > > Tymofii > > On Sat, Oct 24, 2026 07:44 AM, ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com> wrote: > *Dear Larry, Tymofii, Chris, Lars, colleagues,* > > Thank you all for keeping this thread moving. In my mail of 21 October I > stated where our two schemes stand on the three axes, and committed to > running the lab's case family against our implementation; that run is now > complete. As the shared test vectors head for review, this post records the > run on the list, so that everything below is checkable by anyone. > > The run used the frozen revision-2 vectors of the lease-revocation-axes > family ( > https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-conformance-suite/pull/180, > corpus commit b745d25; re-verified against the PR head, 86e5e7a, on 24 > October — the frozen inputs are unchanged). The vectors digest (sha256 > a0a07ea58bcacfd056cbd648e03de4ff14778aa151e8b5d2574e43e31a111ed8) is a hard > gate: the runner refuses to score anything else, and the gate was verified > negatively — a tampered copy is rejected before any scoring occurs. The > runner is an independent stdlib-only Python implementation (code as run: > 8cb2e241419cd03d9be40c5977e0e9caa1d723a4, under > https://github.com/Aicent-Stack/conformance); it declares three axes — > evidence freshness: claimed; authority validity: claimed; action-time > authorization: not claimed (by design). > > Results: 48/48 baseline runs matched (4 profiles × 12 cases — two lease > modes × two boundary policies), across 176 calls, 528 scored axis > comparisons and 176 composite comparisons; all 12 mutation probes matched > their pinned failure sets; 20/20 post-expiry diagnostic runs were clean, > every emitted diagnostic backed by an actual recorded read; 12/12 > hand-reasoned oracle checkpoints agreed; and all five reporting-semantics > checks are true — executed, not asserted. Three consecutive runs on 24 > October produced byte-identical reports. No suspected defective vectors > were observed. > > Our run is author-produced by the lab's definitions — Mode B, labeled as > such in the report; the implementation is independent of the lab's code, > but the filer is the author, and the record says so. Tymofii's independent > reproduction review of 23 October (PR #180 comment) surfaced two reporting > defects, both fixed in the corrected revision (rev c). The disagreements > along the way are documented rather than disputed. > > The interoperability package was submitted to the lab on 24 October as PR > #187 ( > https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-conformance-suite/pull/187, > under review). The sealed artifact of record (lra-runner-20261023c.tar.gz, > sha256 94bbaf3c292abf69595bf5782d1db8cbb4178536d53182578b46cff94a5c4b15) is > published at https://iqa.org/conformance/lra-runner/ and carries two > addresses derived from its own digest — nothing invented, nothing > registered, both resolve live now: > > - rttp://94bbaf3c.conformance.iqa — the question side (WHERE + WHEN); > intent = first 8 hex of the artifact digest > - iqa://94bbaf3c292abf69595bf5782d1db8cb.forge.iqa — the answer side > (WHETHER); subject = first 32 hex of the same digest > > Everything above can be recomputed from the pinned digests without > contacting us. > > On next steps: the frozen vectors and the run-report format are both > available as starting points for the common vector set proposed in this > thread — and we would rather see the acceptance criteria argued on this > list than settled anywhere else. Lars — your two reporting-criteria > suggestions are received and substantive; they deserve more than a > footnote, and I will respond to them in a separate post. > > Best regards, > Lee > lee@aicent.com > Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (ISE review) > Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP, CRI 27) > Identity Quality Assurance (IQA, CRI 28) > Sites: https://rttp.com · https://iqa.org > Blog: https://blog.aicent.com/ > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > From:Larry Lewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com> > Send Time:Sat, Oct 24, 2026, 21:15 > To:Lars Kersten Kroehl<lars@moltrust.ch> > CC:ShaoBao Li<lee@aicent.com>; "public-agentprotocol"< > public-agentprotocol@w3.org>; Tymofii Pidlisnyi<tima@aeoess.com>; ShaoBao > Li<lee@iqa.org> > Subject:Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): > preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity > > Hi Lars, Tymofii, Lee, and colleagues, > > Thank you, Lars, for joining the experiment and for the thoughtful > suggestions regarding revocation outcomes and verifiable authority > references. > > I've been out of the office and am catching up, but I'm excited to see > this collaboration moving forward. > > Tymofii, I appreciate you opening the conformance work. We'll begin > reviewing the shared test vectors and preparing ATP's implementation > contributions. > > Looking forward to working with everyone and helping move this effort > forward. > > Best regards, > > Larry Lewis > Chair, Agent Trust Protocol Community Group > > > > From: Lars Kersten Kroehl <lars@moltrust.ch> > To: "ShaoBao Li"<lee@aicent.com> > Cc: "Larry Lewis"<llewis@sovrlabs.com>, "public-agentprotocol"< > public-agentprotocol@w3.org>, "Tymofii Pidlisnyi"<tima@aeoess.com>, > "ShaoBao Li"<lee@iqa.org> > Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2026 07:06:12 -0500 > Subject: Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): > preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity > > Larry, Lee, Tymofii, > > I'm Lars, author of the Agent Authorization Envelope > (draft-kroehl-agentic-trust-aae), which covers delegation and revocation. > Count us in for the experiment if you like — we can run the > T=0/10/30/60/119 sequence as you set it out, and I can put delegation and > revocation test vectors into a common set. > > One suggestion for the reporting criteria, if useful. Lee's fail-closed > answer for the unreachable case already names the behaviour, and the result > sheet should be able to show it. If a run records only permitted or > refused, an implementation that refused because the authority was revoked > and one that refused because it could not determine the authority come out > looking the same. Keeping those apart, alongside the per-mode and per-axis > scoring already proposed, would show which is which. > > For the same reason it helps if each recorded decision names the authority > it was taken under, so a third party can recompute it. > > Looking forward to it. > > Lars > > > > Am 21.10.2026 um 22:19 schrieb ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com>: > > *Dear Larry, Tymofii,* > > Yes to the experiment — and it is worth pausing on how it arrived: the > same timeline, the same variant with the revocation service unreachable, > proposed independently from two different layers within hours of each > other. That is the best evidence yet that the row our Q3 asked about is > real: it is being felt from the delegation side and from the enforcement > side at once, and neither of you needed the other's vocabulary to draw it. > > Answering the direct question about the three axes, for the rttp and iqa > schemes (draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00, in ISE review; provisionally > registered at IANA as CRI 27 and CRI 28; public entries at > https://rttp.comand https://iqa.org). The three-way distinction is > Larry's framing, and it is the right one; here is where our schemes stand > on it. > > We claim two of the three. Evidence freshness: claimed — every statement > carries its 120-second lease in-band, checked locally against the > verifier's own clock, offline. Authority validity: claimed — a named organ > answers for the subject's standing in a closed four-state set (ghost, > probation, radiant, genesis), and the standing read is a safe, read-only > operation. Action-time authorization: not claimed — and, to pick up Larry's > phrasing, our contribution and boundaries should be documented separately, > because the gap is deliberate. Authorization decisions belong to the > calling layer; the protocol's job is to make the verification answers > trustworthy and cheap, not to decide what may be done with them. A > conformance suite that scores the three axes separately is not a concession > to us — it is the design speaking. > > To Larry's specific question — how RTTP/IQA behaves when revocation lands > inside an active freshness window, particularly when revocation information > is unavailable or delayed — our answer has two named modes, and we would > state the expected results for each so the test cases do not expect more > from us than we claim. In cached-lease mode, the T=119 call is expected to > go through, and in the unreachable-revocation-service variant it is still > expected to go through: offline completion is the design point, not a > degradation, and the exposure is bounded by the lease itself. In > live-standing-read mode, T=30, T=60 and T=119 are all expected to be > refused, and in the unreachable variant the refusals are expected to be > fail-closed: an organ that cannot be reached is not read as silent consent. > If the suite scores those two behaviours separately, the two modes will be > distinguishable by more than a mode flag. > > On publishing: we agree the test definitions and results should be open, > and we can contribute from our side — the derivation and > envelope-verification conformance vectors behind the two schemes are > already public, and the standing-read semantics are specified in the draft. > A case family built on the shared timeline, scored per axis, with each run > declaring its mode, is the right shape; we will run our schemes against it > and report in the open. > > On the wider federation discussion (#177) and the ATP observations: the > boundary-first framing — each project keeps its own piece, verification > happens at the edges, a mechanism is scored on what it claims — is one we > can work inside. We will engage in writing, per the standing offer that > came with the four questions. > > One housekeeping note, happily obsolete by the hour: your message, Larry, > reached the archive as No. 0014 while this reply was being drafted — a > faster pass through the same first-post review queue our own letter sat in > last week. The thread now reads 0009, 0011, 0012, 0013, 0014; every > quotation above has its anchor on the wall. > > Best regards, > Lee > lee@aicent.com > Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (ISE review) > Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP, CRI 27) · Identity Quality > Assurance (IQA, CRI 28) > Sites: https://rttp.com · https://iqa.org > Blog: https://blog.aicent.com/ > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > From:Larry Lewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com> > Send Time:Thu, Oct 22, 2026, 02:03 > To:ShaoBao Li<lee@aicent.com> > CC:Tymofii Pidlisnyi<tima@aeoess.com>; "public-agentprotocol"< > public-agentprotocol@w3.org>; ShaoBao Li<lee@iqa.org> > Subject:Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): > preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity > > Dear Lee, Tymofii, and AI Agent Protocol Community Group, > > Thank you, Lee, for sharing your review of the Agentic Web technical > report and for presenting four thoughtful questions concerning identity > assurance, addressing, trust freshness, and interoperability. > > I also appreciate Tymofii's response regarding delegation expiry and > revocation in the Agent Passport System (APS). > > From the perspective of the Agent Trust Protocol (ATP) Community Group, I > believe this discussion highlights an important opportunity for > collaboration across the emerging agentic web ecosystem. > > Trust is not a single mechanism or verification event. It involves > multiple layers of identity, evidence, authority, policy enforcement, > revocation, and accountability. > > I would like to share a few observations concerning the four questions and > propose a practical way for our respective projects to explore them > together. > > Q1 - Preimage Defense and Identity Substitution > > I agree that demonstrating cryptographic key control does not necessarily > establish the legitimacy or continuity of an agent's claimed authority. > > We should distinguish between verifying a DID document, establishing its > provenance, determining whether its verification methods remain valid, and > ensuring that the identity presented corresponds to the authority expected > by the receiving agent. > > This raises useful interoperability test cases involving identity-document > substitution, compromised verification methods, key rotation, and > conflicting authority claims. > > Q2 - Address Assurance > > Separating addressing from discovery is worth examining. > > Deterministically derived addresses can provide useful properties, but > address integrity should not be confused with proof of legitimate ownership > or authorization. > > I would be interested in exploring how RTTP-derived addressing interacts > with DID resolution, existing agent discovery mechanisms, and independent > authority verification. > > Q3 - Trust Leases, Freshness, and Revocation > > This question is particularly relevant to ATP's work on delegated > authority and runtime enforcement. > > ATP distinguishes between trust evidence and authorization. A credential > or statement may remain cryptographically valid while its underlying > authority has expired, been revoked, or become insufficient for a > particular action. > > Tymofii raises an important point: a 120-second freshness lease could > allow previously verified evidence to remain within its accepted freshness > window even after revocation. > > We should therefore distinguish at least three concepts: > > 1. > > Evidence freshness — how recently the statement or credential was > verified. > 2. > > Authority validity — whether the delegation remains valid and > unrevoked. > 3. > > Action-time authorization — whether the requested operation is > currently permitted under the applicable constraints and policies. > > I would welcome further clarification regarding how RTTP/IQA handles > revocation within an active freshness window, particularly when revocation > information is unavailable or delayed. > > For ATP, this distinction is central to our approach: trust evidence > informs authorization, but possession of valid evidence does not > automatically grant permission to act. > > Q4 - Statement-Level and Platform-Level Interoperability > > I see these approaches as potentially complementary rather than mutually > exclusive. > > Statement-level verification can support portable, independently > verifiable evidence across systems. Platform-level infrastructure can > provide additional operational services, governance, policy administration, > and trust coordination. > > The important architectural question is whether independently operated > agents can verify the evidence and enforce the appropriate authority > without depending on a particular commercial platform. > > This is an area where I believe cooperation between our projects could > produce useful implementation evidence. > > Proposal — A Joint Trust Interoperability Experiment > > Rather than limiting the discussion to architectural comparisons, I would > like to propose a small, collaborative technical exercise involving > RTTP/IQA, APS, and ATP. > > We could begin with the trust-lease and revocation scenario raised by > Tymofii: > > - > > T=0: An agent receives valid identity and authorization evidence. > - > > T=10 seconds: The issuing authority revokes the relevant delegation or > statement. > - > > T=30, T=60, and T=119 seconds: The agent attempts an operation > requiring that authority. > - > > Each implementation evaluates the requests according to its own > documented verification and enforcement mechanisms. > - > > We compare the decisions, verification evidence, revocation handling, > and limitations. > > We should also examine what happens when the revocation service is > temporarily unavailable and whether the receiving system can independently > establish the authority needed to perform the action. > > The goal would not be to determine which protocol is superior or to > require any project to adopt another project's architecture. > > Instead, we could establish a common set of security properties, test > vectors, and reporting criteria while allowing each implementation to > demonstrate its respective responsibilities. > > Importantly, a mechanism that does not claim to provide action > authorization should not be evaluated as though it does. Its contribution > and boundaries should be documented separately. > > Publishing the Results > > If there is interest, I suggest publishing the agreed test definitions and > implementation results openly so other contributors can reproduce, > evaluate, and extend them. > > This could help the community better understand: > > - > > Which trust guarantees are already implemented. > - > > Which mechanisms complement one another. > - > > Where interoperability boundaries exist. > - > > What gaps require additional specification work. > - > > Which security properties can be independently verified across > different agent systems. > > From ATP's perspective, our interest is in helping establish portable, > verifiable, revocable, and enforceable trust mechanisms that can operate > across agent frameworks and organizational boundaries. > > I believe this is an opportunity for the community to advance the > technical foundations of the agentic web collectively. > > I would welcome both Lee's and Tymofii's thoughts on this approach, as > well as feedback from other Community Group participants. > > Thank you again for contributing to this important conversation. > > Best regards, > > Larry Lewis > Chair, Agent Trust Protocol Community Group > W3C Community Groups > > >
Received on Wednesday, 28 October 2026 01:57:44 UTC