Re: Remaining questions for Zoom meeting 2026-10-21

Alan, I understand what you're pointing to, and criticism from a veteran is
fair. Still, for some reason it poked me, so here's my side back.

Attenuation and delegation have been around for decades, of course. But
when I started APS, I was trying to solve agent identity and realized it
wasn't a problem I could fully solve. So I started asking a different
question: if an identity gets compromised, how do we limit the damage an
agent can do?

That's what led me to apply monotonic narrowing to agent authority and
actions. I wrote about that work back in March:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18932404&source=gmail&ust=1793230221483000&sa=E

I think there's a meaningful contribution in applying these ideas to
autonomous agents, even if the underlying principles are much older.

Thanks for the references. I'll take a closer look at them.

Tymofii

On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 04:11 PM, Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote:

> The Agent Passport System appears to be one of many specs for attenuated
> delegation.  I also learned about the Agent Authorization Envelope from
> this email thread.  Am I going to encounter more?
>
> So far, none of them cite prior work going back to Simple Public Key
> Infrastructure (SPKI <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2693>,
> 1999) and continuing to zcaps
> <https://w3c-ccg.github.io/zcap-spec/v0.4.0/> and UCAN
> <https://ucan.xyz/specification/>, which are both in production use.
> There are also hash based schemes, such as Macaroons
> <https://github.com/rescrv/libmacaroons> and Biscuits
> <https://www.biscuitsec.org/>.  Then there's AAuth
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol> from
> one of the OAuth authors.
>
> I would normally say that not doing your literature search first is a
> problem, but in this case I've learned something new from each spec.
>
> --------------
> Alan Karp
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 9:16 PM Tymofii Pidlisnyi <tima@aeoess.com> wrote:
>
>> Ren,
>>
>> For tracing the permission chain, I would use signed delegation records.
>> In the Agent Passport System, each delegation records who gave authority to
>> whom and the limits attached to it. Further delegation must stay within the
>> scope, spending limit and validity period it received.
>>
>> That lets the receiving system inspect how authority reached the
>> requesting agent. Before allowing an action, it still needs to check
>> whether that authority remains valid and covers the requested operation
>> under its own policy. That includes deciding how fresh revocation
>> information must be and what to do when it is unavailable.
>>
>> A signed receipt can then record whether the request was allowed or
>> denied. The receipt makes that decision verifiable. It does not establish
>> that every risk associated with the action was checked.
>>
>> On agent-to-agent trust, I would keep Larry's distinction. An agent can
>> choose how it assesses a counterparty, using prior interactions or other
>> evidence. That assessment cannot give it permissions the principal never
>> delegated. The same boundary applies when deciding which resources it may
>> share with another agent.
>>
>> For ANP, I would leave room for requests to carry delegation evidence
>> that the receiving system can verify. Different mechanisms could supply
>> that evidence, while the receiving system decides which it accepts. ANP
>> would not need to define a universal measure of trustworthiness.
>>
>> The related candidate revocation tests are available for review in the
>> Agent Authority Conformance lab: https://www.google.com/url?q=
>> https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-
>> conformance-suite/pull/180&source=gmail&ust=1792901795054000&sa=E
>>
>> Tymofii Pidlisnyi (Agent Passport System)
>> https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/agent-
>> passport-system/agent-passport-system&source=gmail&
>> ust=1792901795054000&sa=E
>>
>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 05:57 PM, Ren Yushan <keotheodangcha548@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I think we all have deep thoughts about the single word TRUST. And the
>>> TRUST can mean a lot.
>>>
>>> However, what I want to ask is *what is the agent native way to Agent
>>> TRUST when agents communicate*?
>>>
>>> Then we break up TRUST to several cases like:
>>>
>>> Agent <-TRUST-> Agent
>>> Human <-TRUST-> Agent
>>> Agent <-TRUST-> App Service(Access data or Agentic Payment)
>>>
>>> I think we can first fill in these blanks:
>>>
>>> What is Agent Identity? --- ANP DID
>>> Who is behind the Agent? --- Authority granted human's agent DID
>>> What can an Agent delegate access? --- App Service defines it.
>>> Why can an Agent access? --- Human's intention.
>>> Who can verify Human's intention? --- Trust Protocol
>>> Can an Agent delegate to another Agent? --- Permission chain
>>> How to trace the Permission chain? --- ???
>>> *Can an Agent trust another Agent? --- ???*
>>> *What resource should/should not an Agent send to another? --- ???*
>>> ......
>>>
>>> Then fall back to the ANP protocol:
>>>
>>> What should belong to ANP?
>>> What should other protocols fill? What are they?
>>>
>>> Best Regards,
>>> Yushan Ren
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 12:22 AM Chris <chopmob@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear Larry and colleagues,
>>>>
>>>> I agree that the distinction between communication trust, entity trust
>>>> and behaviour or execution trust is a useful way to locate responsibility
>>>> across the stack.
>>>>
>>>> I would add a separate distinction between a trust judgement and an
>>>> authority grant.
>>>>
>>>> A trust judgement is an assessment made by a receiving agent. It may be
>>>> based on identity evidence, credentials, previous interactions, runtime
>>>> observations or other signals. It is local to the verifier, dependent on
>>>> its policy and capable of changing as new evidence arrives.
>>>>
>>>> Delegated authority is different. It is an attributable grant from a
>>>> principal or authorised delegator. It should have an identifiable issuer,
>>>> subject, scope, validity period and revocation mechanism. It answers what
>>>> the agent may do, not whether another agent currently appears trustworthy.
>>>>
>>>> The two can therefore produce different results:
>>>>
>>>> an agent may be considered trustworthy but lack authority for the
>>>> requested action;
>>>> an agent may hold a valid delegation but still fail the receiving
>>>> party's trust or risk policy;
>>>> a positive trust judgement must not widen a delegation, extend its
>>>> validity, or override revocation;
>>>> a valid delegation must not be treated as proof that every interaction
>>>> with the agent is trustworthy.
>>>> A third decision is then required: whether this particular action is
>>>> permitted under the applicable policy. That decision combines the authority
>>>> grant, current revocation state, action scope and the receiving party's
>>>> trust or risk evidence. It should not be inferred from any one of those
>>>> inputs alone.
>>>>
>>>> From an operator's perspective, this is also an accountability
>>>> boundary. The operator defines the applicable policy, scope, thresholds and
>>>> failure mode. An agent's trust judgement can be an input to that policy,
>>>> but it cannot become self-authorising. The enforcement point must decide
>>>> before the external side effect and should produce an explicit allow, refer
>>>> or deny result with evidence of the inputs used. If revocation or trust
>>>> evidence is unavailable, the operator should expose the selected fail-open
>>>> or fail-closed behaviour rather than leaving it implicit.
>>>>
>>>> A practical payment example makes the boundary visible. An agent may
>>>> assess a merchant or service as trustworthy based on identity and prior
>>>> behaviour. Before the agent can spend, the receiving system must still
>>>> verify the principal's delegation, the permitted scope and amount, the
>>>> intended recipient, the validity period and the current revocation state.
>>>> If the delegation has been revoked, a positive trust judgement cannot
>>>> restore it. If the delegation is valid but the service fails the receiver's
>>>> risk policy, the result may be refusal or referral according to that
>>>> policy, but it should not be an automatic allow.
>>>>
>>>> This suggests an additional interoperability test family alongside the
>>>> freshness and revocation cases:
>>>>
>>>> valid delegation and positive trust judgement;
>>>> valid delegation and negative or insufficient trust evidence;
>>>> positive trust judgement but no delegation for the requested action;
>>>> positive trust judgement after the delegation has been revoked;
>>>> valid delegation with an action outside its scope;
>>>> unavailable or stale trust evidence and unavailable revocation
>>>> information.
>>>> The expected result should be reported separately for:
>>>>
>>>> trust assessment;
>>>> authority validity;
>>>> action scope and policy decision;
>>>> execution outcome.
>>>> The key invariant should be that trust evidence can inform an
>>>> authorisation policy, but cannot silently become authority. Equally,
>>>> authority can establish permission to act within a scope, but cannot by
>>>> itself establish trustworthiness of the counterparty or the outcome.
>>>>
>>>> This separation would allow different protocols to contribute identity,
>>>> evidence, delegation or execution records without requiring one protocol to
>>>> own the entire trust decision. It also gives the test suite a way to show
>>>> precisely where implementations agree and where their responsibilities stop.
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>>
>>>> AlgoVoi
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, 22 Oct 2026 at 17:10, Larry Lewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Dear Sean, Ren, Alan, and Community Group,
>>>>>
>>>>> I am loving these discussions and insights. Like to just add that I
>>>>> believe the distinction Sean has drawn between communication trust, entity
>>>>> trust, and behavior/execution trust provides a useful foundation for
>>>>> identifying the responsibilities of each layer.
>>>>>
>>>>> I also think Ren and Alan raise an important additional question: who
>>>>> ultimately has the authority to act on a trust decision?
>>>>>
>>>>> An autonomous agent may evaluate another agent using credentials,
>>>>> prior interactions, runtime evidence, or other mechanisms. Those
>>>>> assessments can help the agent determine whether an interaction is
>>>>> trustworthy.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, I believe we should distinguish an agent's trust assessment
>>>>> from its authority to perform an action.
>>>>>
>>>>> A verified identity does not automatically establish trustworthiness.
>>>>> Likewise, evidence of trustworthiness does not automatically establish
>>>>> delegated authority.
>>>>>
>>>>> From the Agent Trust Protocol (ATP) perspective, we have been
>>>>> exploring this separation through identity verification, trust evidence,
>>>>> bounded mandates, revocation, and runtime policy enforcement.
>>>>>
>>>>> I see an opportunity for complementary layers rather than requiring
>>>>> ANP itself to solve every aspect of trust.
>>>>>
>>>>> ANP can provide interoperable communication and identity mechanisms.
>>>>> Other systems can contribute credentials, attestations, delegated
>>>>> authority, and behavioral evidence. The receiving system can then evaluate
>>>>> that evidence under its own applicable authorization policy.
>>>>>
>>>>> This also allows flexibility in how agents establish confidence
>>>>> without making security-critical authorization constraints optional.
>>>>>
>>>>> One question I would add to the discussion is:
>>>>>
>>>>> *How should we distinguish the trust judgment made by an autonomous
>>>>> agent from the authority delegated to that agent by its operator or
>>>>> principal?*
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe this could be evaluated through practical interoperability
>>>>> tests.
>>>>>
>>>>> We have already proposed a collaborative experiment involving ATP,
>>>>> Agent Passport System, and RTTP/IQA to examine evidence freshness,
>>>>> revocation, and action-time authorization. Alan's question suggests an
>>>>> additional test: whether a positive agent-to-agent trust judgment can ever
>>>>> substitute for authorization from the appropriate principal.
>>>>>
>>>>> My view is that it should not.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would welcome further thoughts on how we might define these
>>>>> boundaries in a protocol-neutral way while leaving room for different
>>>>> implementations and trust mechanisms.
>>>>>
>>>>> Keep Innovating,
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry Lewis
>>>>> Chair, Agent Trust Protocol Community Group
>>>>> llewis@sovrlabs.com
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Sean Zhang <seanzhang9999@gmail.com>
>>>>> To: "Ren Yushan"<keotheodangcha548@gmail.com>
>>>>> Cc: "Alan Karp"<alanhkarp@gmail.com>, <public-agentprotocol@w3.org>
>>>>> Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 07:47:27 -0500
>>>>> Subject: Re: Remaining questions for Zoom meeting 2026-10-21
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Ren,
>>>>>
>>>>> I think we may be discussing several different kinds of trust at the
>>>>> same time, which makes it difficult to evaluate the role of DID or ANP
>>>>> itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> My current understanding is as follows.
>>>>>
>>>>> ANP is primarily an agent networking protocol for identity discovery,
>>>>> addressing, communication, and invocation. In that sense, its role is
>>>>> closer to HTTP in the Internet stack. Its primary responsibility is
>>>>> enabling interoperable communication between agents rather than solving
>>>>> every trust problem at the application layer.
>>>>>
>>>>> Similar to how HTTP relies on HTTPS and PKI-based certificate systems
>>>>> to establish server trust, ANP adopts DID as its identity anchor. This
>>>>> allows ANP to leverage the broader DID/VC ecosystem for identity
>>>>> verification, credentials, and trust enhancement.
>>>>>
>>>>> From my perspective, at least three different layers of trust should
>>>>> be distinguished:
>>>>> 1. Communication Trust
>>>>>
>>>>> At the communication level, a DID associated with a cryptographic key
>>>>> can prove message origin, authenticity, and integrity.
>>>>>
>>>>> This answers the question:
>>>>>
>>>>> "Who am I communicating with?"
>>>>>
>>>>> The trust here is fundamentally cryptographic.
>>>>> 2. Entity Trust
>>>>>
>>>>> A cryptographically verified identity does not automatically imply
>>>>> that the underlying entity is trustworthy.
>>>>>
>>>>> The trustworthiness of an organization, individual, service provider,
>>>>> or agent operator typically requires additional evidence such as
>>>>> credentials, verifiable claims, certifications, organizational
>>>>> endorsements, regulatory qualifications, or reputation systems.
>>>>>
>>>>> This answers the question:
>>>>>
>>>>> "Is this entity trustworthy?"
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Behavior / Execution Trust
>>>>>
>>>>> Even if an entity is trustworthy, that does not automatically prove it
>>>>> is currently behaving as claimed.
>>>>>
>>>>> Behavior trust may be established through multiple forms of evidence,
>>>>> including:
>>>>>
>>>>>    - Runtime attestation
>>>>>    - TEE-based proofs
>>>>>    - Verifiable computation
>>>>>    - Audit logs
>>>>>    - Challenge-response interactions
>>>>>    - Historical performance records
>>>>>    - Reputation accumulated through repeated interactions
>>>>>
>>>>> This answers the question:
>>>>>
>>>>> "Is this agent actually operating according to its claimed behavior
>>>>> right now?"
>>>>>
>>>>> In this sense, the interaction patterns you described between agents
>>>>> can also be viewed as mechanisms for establishing behavioral trust. They
>>>>> help participants gain confidence through observation, verification, and
>>>>> accumulated evidence.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, those interactions are different from communication trust
>>>>> itself. They are built on top of an already established cryptographic
>>>>> identity layer.
>>>>>
>>>>> Therefore, my view is that communication trust, entity trust, and
>>>>> behavior/execution trust are related but distinct problems. DID primarily
>>>>> provides an identity anchor for communication trust. VC and similar
>>>>> mechanisms help establish entity trust. Runtime proofs and
>>>>> interaction-based verification contribute to behavior trust.
>>>>>
>>>>> ANP can provide the foundation and extensibility points for these
>>>>> trust layers, but I do not think all of them need to be solved directly by
>>>>> the base protocol itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> In one sentence:
>>>>>
>>>>> Identity proves who you are, credentials prove what you are allowed or
>>>>> qualified to do, and behavioral evidence proves that you are actually
>>>>> acting as claimed.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best, Sean
>>>>>
>>>>> Ren Yushan <keotheodangcha548@gmail.com> 于2026年10月22日周四 13:40写道:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Alan, your questions are right to the point. Here are what I
>>>>> meant. Just some brainstorming ideas.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 7:26 AM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> A great point, but I think we need to answer some questions first.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does the agent make the trust decision or does the agent's operator,
>>>>> the legal person who gave it its prompt?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  The agent chooses what means a trust. We can give the agent some
>>>>> advice, some choices, and the agent chooses what to use or whether to use
>>>>> it or not. But keep these choices as advices, not protocol. We'd better
>>>>> think carefully about what to do, or what not to do.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Does one agent trust another, or does it trust the other agent's
>>>>> operator?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Still the agent, agent to agent trust.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Trust is based on the question, "Are you the guy I interacted with
>>>>> last time?"  As you note, the answer depends on a credential.  Do we
>>>>> know that agents won't share credentials, and does that affect trust
>>>>> decisions?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Trust is from many sources. If we force the agent to use which
>>>>> cryptographic way, the trust is limited to getting the right signature. It
>>>>> is becoming easier. What I brainstormed was to leave it an OPTION not a
>>>>> MUST. The agent to agent chat channel is already well established by the
>>>>> E2E communication. We need them to trust each other in the agent native way.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------
>>>>> Alan Karp
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 4:03 PM Ren Yushan <
>>>>> keotheodangcha548@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>
>>>>> I'd like to raise a point about one interaction in the ANP protocol —
>>>>> specifically, how trust between agents is handled once they are talking to
>>>>> each other.
>>>>>
>>>>> If two agents want to communicate, they first have to discover each
>>>>> other and establish a connection. A separate concern is that, while they
>>>>> are chatting, they need to trust each other.
>>>>>
>>>>> The difficulty arises when that trust is written into the protocol. It
>>>>> has to become a normative statement — a formulation you use to verify that
>>>>> the other party is a safe object. But in reality, when we chat, there is no
>>>>> security-verification step. We do not run some protocol while talking in
>>>>> order to guarantee that the information is safe. Safety is something we
>>>>> discover during the conversation: whether this person is reliable or not.
>>>>>
>>>>> So I would argue that the protocol should not try to define what is
>>>>> safe, what is unsafe, and what is trustworthy. Instead, it could offer
>>>>> reference suggestions about what means agents might use to communicate —
>>>>> for example, a password, or a standardised JSON format. But if that format
>>>>> is hard-coded into the protocol, it cannot be switched; and if it later
>>>>> turns out to be insecure, the protocol itself acquires a hole.
>>>>>
>>>>> So could we take a step back: not define the protocol, only give
>>>>> reference definitions? Since agents can communicate in text, why not let
>>>>> them use text to establish trust? Give them a verification method they can
>>>>> choose — they decide whether to use it, and which one. That is my view of
>>>>> trust. Happy to hear counterarguments, especially from anyone who thinks
>>>>> trust can be made normative without the protocol becoming brittle.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>> Yushan Ren
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>

Received on Tuesday, 27 October 2026 23:30:29 UTC