- From: Steven Zhao <zhaoxinghua07@126.com>
- Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 14:49:12 +0800 (CST)
- To: public-agentprotocol@w3.org
- Message-ID: <45385cf.4df7.1a17c1ec0b4.Coremail.zhaoxinghua07@126.com>
Hi all, I'm Xinghua Zhao, an independent researcher working on lifecycle governance of delegated agents ! provenance, scope boundaries and revocation (ORCID 0009-0001-0512-1237). I've been following this CG's work on agent discovery, identification and collaboration protocols. Next week (November 6), Agentic Internet Workshop #3 takes place at the Computer History Museum in Mountain View ! the open-space event in the IIW tradition, where people building MCP / A2A / UCP / AP2 and the adjacent W3C / IETF / OIDF / DIF work meet in person. I can't attend (I'm based in Beijing), so I'd like to propose two topics through this list, and to ask a favor: if anyone on this list is attending in person, would you be willing to raise them in the opening circle? **Topic 1 ! Identity and delegation chains across MCP and A2A: aligning W3C, IETF and OIDF work.** The AIW topics page identifies delegation and authorization as its largest cluster: how authority passes from humans or organizations to agents and stays bounded, revocable and auditable. My interest is where the "each hop individually compliant, but the whole chain exceeding its mandate" problem actually sits in the stack, and how the tracks converge or diverge: this CG and the Agent Identity Registry / Memory Interop groups on the W3C side; CATALIST, the OAuth-on-behalf-of-user and GNAP-based delegation drafts, DAWN and webbotauth on the IETF side; and AIIM on the OIDF side. A shared vocabulary for delegation chains that cross MCP and A2A ! and for what a revocation boundary looks like at each hop ! would be the outcome I'd hope for. **Topic 2 ! Revocable, auditable authority for agent chains: machine-speed, execution-time consent.** Long-running agent chains accumulate authority far beyond the moment of consent. The questions I'd bring: where do execution-time consent checkpoints belong (MCP tool calls, A2A handoffs); what audit logs and telemetry must capture to make delegation auditable across protocol boundaries; and how a human ! or a policy layer ! retains the ability to pause, halt and revoke a running agent, including when intent drifts from the original mandate. I'd be glad to have notes from these sessions folded into the public Book of Proceedings, and to follow up with authors whose work touches agent identity and authorization afterward. If you're attending AIW #3 and happy to raise either topic on my behalf, please reply here or off-list ! much appreciated. Best regards, Xinghua Zhao Independent researcher (SynomosAI initiative) ORCID: 0009-0001-0512-1237 [Disclosure: drafting of this message was assisted by AI; all positions reviewed and approved by me.]
Received on Tuesday, 27 October 2026 06:51:45 UTC