- From: Abisheak P <abisheakp197@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2026 14:31:30 +0530
- To: public-agentprotocol@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CALwwdfr78r_FfVxNvBvUKxVPQ=K=LDmu8p9sSA0QGtpB0PYsWw@mail.gmail.com>
Hi ShaoBao, Lars, and colleagues, This is a highly rigorous thread. The distinction between ancestor_revoked and the "indeterminate class" (unreachable cases) is critical for enterprise adoption. To add to this from the perspective of the NTI-1 reference implementation, we have addressed these exact boundaries using a CapabilityToken with strict Caveat enforcement. Specifically, regarding the two points raised: 1. Determinism over bytes (Pinned Evaluation Instant): We use JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS / RFC 8785) for all payload hashing, ensuring that a signature validates identically across any machine. For the evaluation instant, we bind the timestamp directly into the signed capability token, meaning the validity window is mathematically fixed at the time of issuance. 2. The Unreachable Case (Fail-Closed): We strongly agree with Lee's fail-closed approach. In our Rust core, if a revocation registry node is unreachable, the verifier does not read this as "silent consent." The TrustEngine throws an explicit Indeterminate execution state, halting the action. We have implemented these as test vectors in our open-source repository. If it is helpful for the aps-conformance-suite, we would be happy to submit a PR with our canonical JSON test vectors for the "indeterminate" and "ancestor_revoked" states, so implementations can verify they are failing closed correctly. You can review the NTI-1 core implementation here: https://github.com/abisheakp197/Neutral-Trust-Infrastructure Looking forward to seeing how the taxonomy resolves. Best, Abisheak
Received on Sunday, 25 October 2026 12:36:20 UTC