Re: Remaining questions for Zoom meeting 2026-10-21

Dear Sean, Ren, Alan, and Community Group,

I am loving these discussions and insights. Like to just add that I believe the distinction Sean has drawn between communication trust, entity trust, and behavior/execution trust provides a useful foundation for identifying the responsibilities of each layer.

I also think Ren and Alan raise an important additional question: who ultimately has the authority to act on a trust decision?

An autonomous agent may evaluate another agent using credentials, prior interactions, runtime evidence, or other mechanisms. Those assessments can help the agent determine whether an interaction is trustworthy.

However, I believe we should distinguish an agent's trust assessment from its authority to perform an action.

A verified identity does not automatically establish trustworthiness. Likewise, evidence of trustworthiness does not automatically establish delegated authority.

From the Agent Trust Protocol (ATP) perspective, we have been exploring this separation through identity verification, trust evidence, bounded mandates, revocation, and runtime policy enforcement.

I see an opportunity for complementary layers rather than requiring ANP itself to solve every aspect of trust.

ANP can provide interoperable communication and identity mechanisms. Other systems can contribute credentials, attestations, delegated authority, and behavioral evidence. The receiving system can then evaluate that evidence under its own applicable authorization policy.

This also allows flexibility in how agents establish confidence without making security-critical authorization constraints optional.

One question I would add to the discussion is:

How should we distinguish the trust judgment made by an autonomous agent from the authority delegated to that agent by its operator or principal?

I believe this could be evaluated through practical interoperability tests.

We have already proposed a collaborative experiment involving ATP, Agent Passport System, and RTTP/IQA to examine evidence freshness, revocation, and action-time authorization. Alan's question suggests an additional test: whether a positive agent-to-agent trust judgment can ever substitute for authorization from the appropriate principal.

My view is that it should not.

I would welcome further thoughts on how we might define these boundaries in a protocol-neutral way while leaving room for different implementations and trust mechanisms.

Keep Innovating,


Larry Lewis

Chair, Agent Trust Protocol Community Group

mailto:llewis@sovrlabs.com 




From: Sean Zhang <seanzhang9999@gmail.com>
To: "Ren Yushan"<keotheodangcha548@gmail.com>
Cc: "Alan Karp"<alanhkarp@gmail.com>, <public-agentprotocol@w3.org>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 07:47:27 -0500
Subject: Re: Remaining questions for Zoom meeting 2026-10-21



Hi Ren,

I think we may be discussing several different kinds of trust at the same time, which makes it difficult to evaluate the role of DID or ANP itself.

My current understanding is as follows.

ANP is primarily an agent networking protocol for identity discovery, addressing, communication, and invocation. In that sense, its role is closer to HTTP in the Internet stack. Its primary responsibility is enabling interoperable communication between agents rather than solving every trust problem at the application layer.

Similar to how HTTP relies on HTTPS and PKI-based certificate systems to establish server trust, ANP adopts DID as its identity anchor. This allows ANP to leverage the broader DID/VC ecosystem for identity verification, credentials, and trust enhancement.

From my perspective, at least three different layers of trust should be distinguished:

1. Communication Trust

At the communication level, a DID associated with a cryptographic key can prove message origin, authenticity, and integrity.

This answers the question:

"Who am I communicating with?"


The trust here is fundamentally cryptographic.

2. Entity Trust

A cryptographically verified identity does not automatically imply that the underlying entity is trustworthy.

The trustworthiness of an organization, individual, service provider, or agent operator typically requires additional evidence such as credentials, verifiable claims, certifications, organizational endorsements, regulatory qualifications, or reputation systems.

This answers the question:

"Is this entity trustworthy?"


3. Behavior / Execution Trust

Even if an entity is trustworthy, that does not automatically prove it is currently behaving as claimed.

Behavior trust may be established through multiple forms of evidence, including:

Runtime attestation

TEE-based proofs

Verifiable computation

Audit logs

Challenge-response interactions

Historical performance records

Reputation accumulated through repeated interactions


This answers the question:

"Is this agent actually operating according to its claimed behavior right now?"


In this sense, the interaction patterns you described between agents can also be viewed as mechanisms for establishing behavioral trust. They help participants gain confidence through observation, verification, and accumulated evidence.

However, those interactions are different from communication trust itself. They are built on top of an already established cryptographic identity layer.

Therefore, my view is that communication trust, entity trust, and behavior/execution trust are related but distinct problems. DID primarily provides an identity anchor for communication trust. VC and similar mechanisms help establish entity trust. Runtime proofs and interaction-based verification contribute to behavior trust.

ANP can provide the foundation and extensibility points for these trust layers, but I do not think all of them need to be solved directly by the base protocol itself.

In one sentence:

Identity proves who you are, credentials prove what you are allowed or qualified to do, and behavioral evidence proves that you are actually acting as claimed.


Best, Sean





Ren Yushan < mailto:keotheodangcha548@gmail.com > 于2026年10月22日周四 13:40写道:





Thanks Alan, your questions are right to the point. Here are what I meant. Just some brainstorming ideas.



On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 7:26 AM Alan Karp < mailto:alanhkarp@gmail.com > wrote:

A great point, but I think we need to answer some questions first.


Does the agent make the trust decision or does the agent's operator, the legal person who gave it its prompt?




 

 The agent chooses what means a trust. We can give the agent some advice, some choices, and the agent chooses what to use or whether to use it or not. But keep these choices as advices, not protocol. We'd better think carefully about what to do, or what not to do.






Does one agent trust another, or does it trust the other agent's operator? 








Still the agent, agent to agent trust. 





Trust is based on the question, "Are you the guy I interacted with last time?"  As you note, the answer depends on a credential.  Do we know that agents won't share credentials, and does that affect trust decisions? 








Trust is from many sources. If we force the agent to use which cryptographic way, the trust is limited to getting the right signature. It is becoming easier. What I brainstormed was to leave it an OPTION not a MUST. The agent to agent chat channel is already well established by the E2E communication. We need them to trust each other in the agent native way.






--------------
Alan Karp







On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 at 4:03 PM Ren Yushan < mailto:keotheodangcha548@gmail.com > wrote:

Hi all,



I'd like to raise a point about one interaction in the ANP protocol — specifically, how trust between agents is handled once they are talking to each other.



If two agents want to communicate, they first have to discover each other and establish a connection. A separate concern is that, while they are chatting, they need to trust each other.



The difficulty arises when that trust is written into the protocol. It has to become a normative statement — a formulation you use to verify that the other party is a safe object. But in reality, when we chat, there is no security-verification step. We do not run some protocol while talking in order to guarantee that the information is safe. Safety is something we discover during the conversation: whether this person is reliable or not.



So I would argue that the protocol should not try to define what is safe, what is unsafe, and what is trustworthy. Instead, it could offer reference suggestions about what means agents might use to communicate — for example, a password, or a standardised JSON format. But if that format is hard-coded into the protocol, it cannot be switched; and if it later turns out to be insecure, the protocol itself acquires a hole.



So could we take a step back: not define the protocol, only give reference definitions? Since agents can communicate in text, why not let them use text to establish trust? Give them a verification method they can choose — they decide whether to use it, and which one. That is my view of trust. Happy to hear counterarguments, especially from anyone who thinks trust can be made normative without the protocol becoming brittle.



Best regards,

Yushan Ren

Received on Thursday, 22 October 2026 16:09:04 UTC