- From: Paola Di Maio <paola.dimaio@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 22:19:29 +0800
- To: public-agentprotocol <public-agentprotocol@w3.org>, public-webagents <public-webagents@w3.org>, W3C AIKR CG <public-aikr@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAMXe=SrJ1q7jE=as6JwzRvb=RQ-eAGc9wTY_Qqp4GhZRF7_M6Q@mail.gmail.com>
Greetings everyone I am simply keeping an eye out on thiings and have come across this https://github.com/workos/auth.md I wonder, how does this relate to everything else we are discussing/doing/observing in this space? My understanding is that this is an emerging protocol proposal that may be relevant to ongoing discussions around federated identity, delegated authorization, verifiable credentials, and autonomous software agents but not a W3C thing Please feel free to share with related CGs brief analysis: “auth.md”, an OAuth-based agent registration and authorization approach intended for autonomous AI agents operating without traditional browser-mediated consent flows. What makes this notable is not necessarily the specific proposal itself, but the architectural gap it exposes: Current OAuth/OIDC assumptions are heavily browser- and human-centric: - redirect-based consent - interactive authorization - session-oriented mediation - user-present trust boundaries Autonomous agents introduce different requirements: - long-lived delegated authority - non-interactive authorization - machine-verifiable delegation chains - portable trust assertions - agent-scoped identity distinct from user identity - policy-constrained autonomous execution The proposal appears to combine: - OAuth Protected Resource Metadata - signed identity assertions - machine-readable discovery metadata - delegated authorization semantics for agents This seems highly adjacent to: - FedID discussions around federated assertions and browser mediation - VC/DID work on portable cryptographic identity - emerging “agent identity” and “agent authorization” efforts across OpenID, DIF, and IETF communities One particularly interesting aspect is the use of discoverable metadata (“auth.md”) as a capability advertisement layer for agent onboarding and authorization. I suspect we are beginning to see a broader standards gap emerge between: - “users using software” and - “software acting autonomously under delegated authority” Questions I think may be worth discussing: - Are OAuth/OIDC extensions sufficient for agent-native delegation? - Should agent identity be modeled independently from user identity? - What role should VC/DID infrastructure play in portable agent trust? - How should revocation and policy constraints operate for long-lived autonomous agents? - Do we need standardized discovery metadata for agent authorization capabilities? Relevant references: - https://workos.com/auth-md - https://workos.com/blog/agent-registration-with-auth-md - https://www.w3.org/groups/wg/fedid/ - https://www.w3.org/community/credentials/ Curious whether others see this as: - an implementation detail, - an OAuth extension opportunity, or - the beginning of a broader agent identity/authz standardization problem.
Received on Monday, 25 May 2026 14:21:12 UTC