Re: Layering and Shared-key authentication

David Brownell - JavaSoft wrote:
> > A lot of the arguments against shared secret client authentication
> > seem to be layering arguments. Specifically, the argument seems to
> > be that shared secret style authentication properly belongs at the
> > application layer.
> I may be the first person to have mentioned the specific issue of a
> layering violation, and I'll clarify a misunderstanding here.  My issue
> had nothing to do with using shared secrets.  (I can't speak for the
> particular issues anyone else may have intended.)
> My issue was related to the specific proposal made by Microsoft, which
> would force specific application level issues, related to the languages
> and character sets used by applications (and in fact whether the secret
> is directly known to a user or not, etc), into the transport layer
> security protocol.  (Resolve that issue and there were still a bunch of
> other issues ... )
> In no way did I say that "shared secrets" in general are bad to include
> in a transport level, or contrariwise that "public keys" are bad.  One
> only needs to look at GSS-API for an example of some existing practice,
> already deemed reasonable by the IETF.  It supports both schemes.
> If folk want shared secret authentication, I suggest looking at the
> work already done by the GSS-API working group; it's supported Kerberos
> for a long time, and evidently now supports some public key flavors.
> - Dave

Received on Tuesday, 8 October 1996 19:22:35 UTC