- From: David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 10:20:52 -0700
- To: "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <evyncke@cisco.com>
- Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth@ietf.org>, "httpbis-chairs@ietf.org" <httpbis-chairs@ietf.org>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, "tpauly@apple.com" <tpauly@apple.com>
- Message-ID: <CAPDSy+5r0hXw9QXHsHZB=4r7++Q+umacDPM2-kprOt_BpP2WKQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Eric, The security properties of the mechanism rely on TLS being secure. This is mentioned in Section 7 along with minimum TLS version requirements. Thanks, David On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 9:24 AM Eric Vyncke (evyncke) <evyncke@cisco.com> wrote: > Thank you, David, for the feedback and the explanations. > > > > I must admit that I have failed to understand how the system work (and > especially how it cannot be replayed except if the underlying TLS is > assumed secure). > > > > -éric > > > > *From: *David Schinazi <dschinazi.ietf@gmail.com> > *Date: *Tuesday, 17 September 2024 at 18:16 > *To: *Eric Vyncke (evyncke) <evyncke@cisco.com> > *Cc: *The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, > draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth@ietf.org < > draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth@ietf.org>, httpbis-chairs@ietf.org < > httpbis-chairs@ietf.org>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, > tpauly@apple.com <tpauly@apple.com> > *Subject: *Re: Éric Vyncke's No Objection on > draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth-11: (with COMMENT) > > Hi Éric, and thanks for your review. > > I've landed this commit in response to your comments: > > > https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/commit/6965ae390a3ec2554482fe171c6ab96bb37ab5ea > > More detailed responses inline below. > > David > > > > On Tue, Sep 17, 2024 at 3:13 AM Éric Vyncke via Datatracker < > noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > Éric Vyncke has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth-11: No Objection > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to > https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ > for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > # Éric Vyncke, INT AD, comments for draft-ietf-httpbis-unprompted-auth-11 > > Thank you for the work put into this document. > > Please find below some non-blocking COMMENT points (but replies would be > appreciated even if only for my own education). > > Special thanks to Tommy Pauly for the shepherd's detailed write-up > including > the WG consensus and the justification of the intended status. > > I hope that this review helps to improve the document, > > Regards, > > -éric > > # COMMENTS (non-blocking) > > I learned a new English word "probeable", which I misread as "probable" > several > times :-) "Unprompted" was clearer IMHO but this is cosmetic. > > > > I agree with you, in part because my laptop keeps wanting to autocorrect > > "probeable" to "probable" :-). I wasn't able to find a better word, since > > "unprompted" is not an alternative here. I'm open to suggestions. > > > > ## Section 1 > > A time diagram of all exchanges will be welcome by the readers, e.g., > setting > up the TLS session, client sending its key context, (exchange between > frontend > and backend), then (if I understand correctly) the actual authentication > taking > place with a nonce, then actual data transfer. > > > > There's pretty much only one exchange which is: > > client ----Authorization----> server. > > The second one we can add is that when frontend and backend are split > > (which is rare) then it's: > > client ----Authorization----> frontend > -----Authorization+context---->backend. > > Not sure if that diagram would help much though. > > > > ## Section 3.1 > > Suggest to add a reference to the syntax used in Figure 1. > > > > Agree, I added one. > > > > s/s Parameter/"s" Parameter/ ? and similar for "k", ... Noting that this > notation is used in section 4. > > > > The HTTP style guide [1] recommends using double quotes when defining > header > > fields (and by extension, parameters) and not using double quotes when > referring > > to them. We followed that in this document, so we use double quotes in > > section 4, on no quotes in other sections. > > > > [1] https://httpwg.org/admin/editors/style-guide#header-and-trailer-fields > > > > ## Why not mTLS ? > > Should there be a comparaison with mutually authenticated TLS ? I > understand > that mTLS and this I-D work at different layers but mTLS could also be > used for > similar purposes. > > > > mTLS is visible from network operators, and it is probeable by clients, so > it > > doesn't fit the requirements. We could mention this, but that also applies > to > > many other authentication systems, so I'd rather not list every single one > here. >
Received on Tuesday, 17 September 2024 17:21:08 UTC