- From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 22:09:06 -0400
- To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
- Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Received on Friday, 20 March 2020 02:09:32 UTC
Could the draft endorse greasing instead? On Thu, Mar 19, 2020 at 8:46 PM Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 20, 2020, at 11:22, Mark Nottingham wrote: > > > On 20 Mar 2020, at 11:02 am, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> > wrote: > > > In message <ebea7134-3da6-44be-b445-7f79d1717f2b@www.fastmail.com>, > "Martin Tho > > > mson" writes: > > >> Sure, the numbers will be smaller, but why have the rounding at all? > > > > > > To make sure it is not precise enough for framing use. > > This > > And so when someone rounds up and expects that to be ample space, what > then? I'm not sure that I agree that this is a valid threat model. > > Seems like over-rotating to me. If implementations routinely encounter > values that don't match the actual length, then they will learn not to > depend on the two being the same. > >
Received on Friday, 20 March 2020 02:09:32 UTC