Re: Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-httpbis-origin-frame-04: (with COMMENT)


On 10/01/18 16:04, Adam Roach wrote:
> On 1/9/18 9:01 PM, Mark Nottingham wrote:
>> Hi Adam,
>>> On 10 Jan 2018, at 12:34 pm, Adam Roach <> wrote:
>>> This seems a good mechanism overall. The security property of no longer
>>> requiring DNS checks seems a slight bit troublesome, as it (as the draft
>>> acknowledges) makes mounting an attack significantly easier: all that is
>>> required is exploiting a CA, rather than the two-step process of
>>> doing that
>>> plus hijacking DNS in some way. Was there consideration given to
>>> advising that
>>> implementations perform DNS checks after the fact? This would provide
>>> the
>>> latency benefits this mechanism is defined for while allowing at
>>> least for
>>> detection of origin hijacking.
>> Not specifically.
> Given that Mistakes Do Happen[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10], it seems
> it probably should have been. I believe the document needs a bit more
> treatment of this issue before it moves forward.

Just want to check a thing - if one added some DNS check, am
I right that any privacy benefit of the ORIGIN frame might
then be lost? If so, maybe this is more of a trade-off? If
not, then maybe I'm just as confused as usual;-)


Received on Wednesday, 10 January 2018 17:26:12 UTC