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Re: Requirements for Secondary Certificates (#522)

From: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@google.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 15:28:46 +0000
Message-ID: <CANh-dXnEf3jG4rYXkKkzisTv3NSB-qijcBpYEPAq0H_zFW+q3Q@mail.gmail.com>
To: ryan-ietf@sleevi.com
Cc: squid3@treenet.co.nz, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 8:25 AM Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietf@sleevi.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 1:01 AM, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
> wrote:
>> On 11/04/18 08:20, Jeffrey Yasskin wrote:
>> >
>> > If the main problem is that Secondary Certificates make detecting
>> > compromise more difficult, would it help to have clients make a parallel
>> > connection to the DNS-discovered IP address that simply reports who's
>> > using the server's identity? I think it's safe for this connection to
>> > fail open, since if the attacker's network-privileged, they didn't need
>> > to use Secondary Certs.
>> I don't think it would help at all. Recall that DNS/BGP is already
>> compromised in order to perform the attack at all. So any side
>> connection is just as easily caught and faked as the original was.
> I think there may have been a misunderstanding. In the Secondary
> Certificates case, with key compromise, you can mount the attack without a
> DNS/BGP compromise. That is, total effort to mount attack = (key
> compromise). Jeffrey's suggestion is to force a connection establishment -
> even in the case of a Secondary Certificate offer - such that the effective
> steps to compromise require (key compromise) + (BGP hijack, DNS compromise,
> on-path presence). Which is roughly the status quo for today in a
> non-Secondary Certificate case.

That is, effective steps to compromise *without detection*. If the attacker
is willing to be detected, it'd still just take (key compromise).

Received on Wednesday, 11 April 2018 15:29:32 UTC

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