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Re: Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc7238bis-02: (with DISCUSS)

From: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 09:26:43 -0500
Message-ID: <CALaySJLrY=g-JhQB30D6tXtpyxUSiXkFsPVTcWJZuJ6EzZOXkA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, "httpbis-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <httpbis-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>, draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc7238bis@tools.ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
>> We *could* point out the problem, but then, there are so many other similar
>> problems applicable to non-encrypted HTTP that I really don't see why this
>> one deserves to be called specifically.
>
> The reason is that this draft is just about that feature.  Since it's
> a risk not covered in the pointer, it should be in this draft.  If we
> don't point these things out, stuff won't ever get better.   I'm not
> asking for MUSTs, although I'd like it, I don't think it's practical.

For what it's worth, my view as responsible AD:

- Julian is right that this belongs in the HTTP spec, not in this
document, but...

- This document is an available and reasonable place to make the
point, as an informative thing.

I would not object, and I think it would be a good idea, to include a
very short paragraph that goes something like this:

<< Unsecured http is always subject to redirect attacks, in that a
"man in the middle" can replace any http response with a redirect
(such as to a malicious site or one benefiting the attacker).  Such an
attack can use "permanent" redirect codes (301 or 308) to convince
clients or proxies to cache the malicious information.  Secured https
is not subject to these sorts of attacks. >>

I can't imagine that there'd be any controversy about text such as
that... and it only informs, and does not give any new requirements.

Julian, Mark, others: what do you think?

Barry
Received on Wednesday, 4 February 2015 14:27:11 UTC

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