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Re: Kathleen Moriarty's Yes on draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-10: (with COMMENT)

From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 01:33:47 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgRT61soYGp7c77B5tsagaUEQP-xfQXPt_Up9sY2OQ_wRw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, "httpbis-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <httpbis-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression.all@tools.ietf.org, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On Wed, Jan 21, 2015 at 7:02 PM, Kathleen Moriarty <
Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-10: Yes
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
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> Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression/
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Thank you for your work on this draft and for the thorough security
> considerations section.  I do agree with the SecDir reviewer that an
> early reference to the security considerations section would be useful,
> please consider adding that.
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05406.html
> Another good point is that while this draft addresses current threats
> (CRIME), the WG should keep in mind that the attacks could evolve.  This
> is really just to think ahead with options since HPACK is a relatively
> new algorithm, and since encryption of compressed headers is known to be
> somewhat perilous.  It is possible that a clever attacker will develop a
> new attack in the future (i.e., CRIME++ ) that works against
> HPACK-compressed header fields.

I had this thought briefly as well, but then it occurred to me that the
degree of compression in HPACK is up to the encoder.  In particular, the
encoder can send a header list in which all of the header fields are
uncompressed (literal representation, not Huffman-coded).  So in a pinch,
compression can be turned off without having to roll out h3.

Received on Thursday, 22 January 2015 06:34:14 UTC

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