Re: Concluding discussion on #612 (9.2.2)

On 11 October 2014 19:35, Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
wrote:

> The whole point is that after TLS stack has negotiated XYZ, the server
> can't reject it anymore without interop. failure against correct client
> implementation unless the server actually knows it is not 9.2.2.-acceptable


Ilari,

OK I get what you are illustrating now.   Yes it is indeed a problem to
implement 9.2.2 at all
if the server cannot influence the selection of the cipher.

But this is an argument against having 9.2.2 at all - as this is a problem
that results from making
protocol specific cipher requirements in environments where the protocol
implementation is not party
to the cipher negotiation.

Indeed if the client only offers h2, and XYZ and the server has got XYZ in
it cipher suites that the TLS
layer can accept, but then decides that XYZ is not h2 acceptable - then it
is in a mess.        But that
problem exists regardless of my proposal for a retry.   The solution to
that problem is to not have
protocol specific cipher requirements - I'm fully OK with that!

regards






-- 
Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com>  @  Webtide - *an Intalio subsidiary*
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