- From: 陈智昌 <willchan@chromium.org>
- Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 12:33:34 -0700
- To: Nicolas Mailhot <nicolas.mailhot@laposte.net>
- Cc: Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
- Message-ID: <CAA4WUYjNEeWUH8rpmaBeV+z+E8fSQ46WU9dVPY4Eiy+apStYWA@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 4:48 AM, Nicolas Mailhot < nicolas.mailhot@laposte.net> wrote: > > Le Lun 16 juin 2014 21:47, William Chan (陈智昌) a écrit : > > On Jun 16, 2014 2:19 PM, <bizzbyster@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> I don't follow what you are saying about security issues around caching > > sub resources for active content? How is it different from when trusted > > proxy is not active? > > > > Let's say I visit https://foo.com which uses a jQuery URL (perhaps > hosted > > by a CDN like Google's). A MITM proxy can cause a non-canonical version > of > > jQuery to be cached. > > This seems a strawman for me – if you've gone to the length of checking > external code is safe from a security POW it is *idiotic* not to host the > checked version on your own site instead of relying on an external > reference. > > OTOH if you're referencing something from a third party, you've already > delegated your security and adding a proxy to the mix is not going to > change a lot to the situation. And don't tell me the people who do this > monitor the reference to check for changes and audit those changes. > The need to trust a third party is definitely a problem for content authors today. This is one use case for the Subresource Integrity proposal: http://www.w3.org/TR/2014/WD-SRI-20140318/#resource-integrity-1. That said, I do not agree with your assertion that referencing content from a third party is equivalent to being willing to trust a proxy. I am frankly surprised to hear such a statement. Does anyone else agree with this? > And you can argue you trust the third party more than the proxy, but > that's *your* opinion not necessarily the opinion of your users so the > transitive trust issue was opened up the moment js hosting was delegated > to a third party. Current browser UI does not inform users that when they > visit nicecite.com they're really executing monitoring.js from > bigbrother.com. > The nice thing about proxying is that is exposes all the trust issues > caused by mashing up resources without thinking about the security > aspects, instead of burying them in the browser cache where no one thinks > to look before it's too late. > > -- > Nicolas Mailhot > >
Received on Thursday, 19 June 2014 19:34:02 UTC