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Re: Security of cross-origin pushed resources

From: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2013 20:46:59 -0700
Message-ID: <CAP+FsNeEqR5vKCSK7Kb_TFf0x=i9B9Bxr0yt=Pnd56D6BLkwcQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org>
Cc: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>, Jo Liss <joliss42@gmail.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
No, the domain is authenticated, as per the cert. HTTP-level authentication
is different.
-=R


On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 8:13 PM, William Chan (陈智昌)
<willchan@chromium.org>wrote:

> I think you're not stating some context. Are you assuming some form of
> authentication for http URIs?
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 7:53 PM, Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Wait a sec, that isn't what I'm saying..
>>
>> I'm saying, regardless of scheme, that no element should be interpreted
>> as a result of a push for an origin unless that origin has been
>> authenticated.
>> Of course, there are other requirements for HTTPS about authentication,
>> which make this statement less interesting for HTTPS, but it is interesting
>> for HTTP...
>>
>> -=R
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 5:59 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <
>> willchan@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>>> All very convincing points. I'm supportive of changing the spec to
>>> remove cross-origin push for http URIs.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 1:08 PM, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think Jo has a reasonable point. Cross origin pushes that can have
>>>> their domain be backed up by a verifiable cert are pretty awesome, but
>>>> lacking that we shouldn't allow them in an unverified context.
>>>>
>>>> no matter what we do in specification land, people are going to put L4
>>>> load balancers in front of two nodes that aren't really related to each
>>>> other (an issue the cert can sort out) and this becomes a pretty easy
>>>> exploit. We would essentially be changing the definition of origin from
>>>> hostname to be resolved-ip and I don't think that's in our purview to do.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:26 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <
>>>> willchan@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I think this is a good question that I don't know is well specified
>>>>> anywhere. I recall us discussing for HTTP/1.1 whether or not it's feasible
>>>>> for a client to reuse a TCP connection for the same destination IP address,
>>>>> even if it's for different origins. My understanding is mnot ran a quick
>>>>> test of the feasibility and showed that it works 99.X% of the time or
>>>>> something, but my memory's vague on the matter. Mark can correct me here.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I've done the research on this in the past - but the details are fuzzy.
>>>> There was a prominent LB that had a switch through mode that was a
>>>> recommended performance best practice.. basically after finding the first
>>>> request (cookies and host header primarily) it determined what back end to
>>>> use and from there just went into a TCP tunnel thereafter. So there were
>>>> definite security issues and interop argument along the lines of "it works
>>>> for N nines" probably isn't enough.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
Received on Saturday, 21 September 2013 03:47:26 UTC

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