W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-http-wg@w3.org > July to September 2013

Re: Security of cross-origin pushed resources

From: 陈智昌 <willchan@chromium.org>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2013 17:59:32 -0700
Message-ID: <CAA4WUYiPYME2kS22acAnF3hGjZmHk6w+Ejx7Xev9c9izuoF70w@mail.gmail.com>
To: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
Cc: Jo Liss <joliss42@gmail.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
All very convincing points. I'm supportive of changing the spec to remove
cross-origin push for http URIs.

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 1:08 PM, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>wrote:

> I think Jo has a reasonable point. Cross origin pushes that can have their
> domain be backed up by a verifiable cert are pretty awesome, but lacking
> that we shouldn't allow them in an unverified context.
> no matter what we do in specification land, people are going to put L4
> load balancers in front of two nodes that aren't really related to each
> other (an issue the cert can sort out) and this becomes a pretty easy
> exploit. We would essentially be changing the definition of origin from
> hostname to be resolved-ip and I don't think that's in our purview to do.
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:26 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org
> > wrote:
>> I think this is a good question that I don't know is well specified
>> anywhere. I recall us discussing for HTTP/1.1 whether or not it's feasible
>> for a client to reuse a TCP connection for the same destination IP address,
>> even if it's for different origins. My understanding is mnot ran a quick
>> test of the feasibility and showed that it works 99.X% of the time or
>> something, but my memory's vague on the matter. Mark can correct me here.
> I've done the research on this in the past - but the details are fuzzy.
> There was a prominent LB that had a switch through mode that was a
> recommended performance best practice.. basically after finding the first
> request (cookies and host header primarily) it determined what back end to
> use and from there just went into a TCP tunnel thereafter. So there were
> definite security issues and interop argument along the lines of "it works
> for N nines" probably isn't enough.
Received on Saturday, 21 September 2013 01:00:00 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Friday, 17 January 2020 17:14:15 UTC