- From: Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa <tatsuhiro.t@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 28 Jul 2013 12:56:32 +0900
- To: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Received on Sunday, 28 July 2013 03:57:19 UTC
Under the current header compression scheme, the receiver has no way to check that the received header set is what the sender intended to transmit. I think it would be good to add some kind of integrity checking against uncompressed header sets(e.g., parity, hash, etc). This problem does not occur if both ends correctly implement header compression. But there are several corner cases (index shadowing, etc) and its implementation complexity is certainly higher than current HTTP/1.1 and SPDY, it may go wrong easier than before. For example, if client encodes index badly (off-by-one error, for example), the server may see the wrong index. The thing is this might not be noticeable in one request/response. It might be apparent after several requests, possibly after eviction occurs. This problem is more serious for proxy. If proxy coalesces streams for requests to different origin servers just like what secure SPDY proxy does, misinterpreting headers may leak cookies to other unintended sites. Best regards, Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa
Received on Sunday, 28 July 2013 03:57:19 UTC