- From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
- Date: Tue, 07 May 2013 20:41:56 +0000
- To: Mike Bishop <Michael.Bishop@microsoft.com>
- cc: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
In message <abb2201dec3a405aa735f1d09a7a8404@BY2PR03MB025.namprd03.prod.outlook .com>, Mike Bishop writes: > Better to know up front. We can specify an initial (large) value > and peers only need to change it if they need to restrict to a > smaller value. I think you got that backwards... The default limit needs to be small, until the server is willing to invest resources in the client. (Repeat after me: HTTP/2.0 SHALL make DoS attacks harder, not easier.) -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Tuesday, 7 May 2013 20:42:20 UTC