- From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
- Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 09:30:31 +0100
- To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
- CC: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "Adrien W. de Croy" <adrien@qbik.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Hi Willy, On 09/13/2012 06:47 AM, Willy Tarreau wrote: > Hi Mark, > > On Thu, Sep 13, 2012 at 03:06:24PM +1000, Mark Nottingham wrote: >> I haven't seen any more discussion of this. >> >> Being that both the TLS WG Chair and at least one security AD have both >> unambiguously said that it should be considered an e2e protocol (please >> correct if I'm wrong), we return to the original question -- >> >> Should we state that the HTTPS URI scheme implies end-to-end security (i.e., >> between the user-agent and the origin server)? > > I have thought a bit about the arguments made in favor of this and my > opinion has evolved on the subject. I think that we should probably keep > the https scheme as "end-to-end" so that the user is sure about this, > but in this case we'd need another scheme for the https from proxy to Do you mean another URI scheme? That might be a way forward since it'd allow both ends (UA, site) some choice in whether they'd allow middlebox snooping. > origin server that browsers would switch to for a given site when the > proxy would refuse access. Basically it would look like this : > - user types https://forum.example.com/ in his browser But that uses the https URI scheme, that we just agreed is defined to have e2e security properties. I'm confused now. > - proxy says "NAK, switch to insecure mode if you want" > - browser asks "Proxy can't let you go there without inspecting contents, > do you agree to let it see the contents you're accessing ?" > - if the user clicks YES, then the browser uses the hop-by-hop scheme for > every attempt to access https://<this site> and makes it quite clear > (eg: by changing the color of the URL bar). > - if the user clicks NO, then no access is performed. > > I think it can be a bit complex to implement in browsers but they're already > handling per-site certificate exceptions, so I don't think it would be > something very different. Asking the user if they approve of a middlebox "seeing" their traffic seems fairly broken to me really. Why would we expect that'd make any sense to users? Cheers, S. > And the benefit of the alternative scheme is that non-browser clients could > easily be configured to make use of it (eg for automatic software updates, > etc...). > > Regards, > Willy > > >
Received on Thursday, 13 September 2012 08:31:09 UTC