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Re: Content security model

From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 09:01:14 +0000
To: Mike Belshe <mike@belshe.com>
cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-ID: <4936.1343293274@critter.freebsd.dk>
In message <CABaLYCtZjfR0S3fz-vt8S6ZPaa05B0e5X+7tWPYb=5pZg7kGGA@mail.gmail.com>
, Mike Belshe writes:

>Actually, TLS is end-to-end encrypted and just an opaque byte stream as far
>as intermediaries are concerned.  I'm not sure what you mean by hop-by-hop,
>but TLS is not (to me) hop-by-hop.

TLS is, as far as content is concerned hop-by-hop.

Usage of the broken CA-certificate model for key-material limits TLS
to one hop which connects end to end, but other key-material models
support more hops.

This is one of the reasons I push the envelope+(metadata+content)
model for HTTP/2.0:  You can use TLS to gain privacy for
the envelope on a hop-by-hop basis, while still allowing the
intermediaries to act on that envelope, and while still having
end-to-end privacy on the metadata+content.

Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Thursday, 26 July 2012 09:01:47 UTC

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