- From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
- Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2012 20:16:04 +0000
- To: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
- cc: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Philippe Mougin <pmougin@acm.org>
In message <CABP7RbfSHZ494pmFSYFyX_g7M3YQyuG0GM4RZ2NJJ22nVMTvig@mail.gmail.com> , James M Snell writes: >A. We need a protocol-level concept of a "Routing Token" to address #2. The >use of this mechanism is strictly to provide intermediaries with a method >of establishing a generally-persistent routing path for all requests >originating from the same client. And here it might get tricky: What do we mean by "client", if every public PC in the library has been routed through the same HTTP-filter ? I suspect we actually mean "user" and not "client". (This is btw. where my "anon/identified-user" bit idea comes from) >This token is NOT intended to be used to >identify or access shared application state. In fact, it is questionable as >to whether this routing token should be visible to the application layer at >all. Well, if the client-end is entirely in charge of producing the session-id, it is in essence just a random number, and there are only so many bad things you can do with a random number, so if the application can beneficially use it (to look up server-side state ?) then it should be exposed. The "anon/idendtified" bit should always be exposed if we do that. >The token could, theoretically, be transmitted entirely in the clear >without risk of inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information. The one >caveat, however, is that there must be a mechanism to protect the integrity >of the token. It is at this point, not clear to me if the token would be hop-by-hop or end-to-end. There are significant advantages to both, hop-to-hop in particular if the "chain" gets broken by HTTP/1.1 hops underway, but "end-to-end in HTTP/2.0 protocol" solves that too. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Friday, 20 July 2012 20:16:31 UTC