- From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
- Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2012 16:23:39 +0000
- To: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
- CC: Tim Bray <tbray@textuality.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <5567E1B7-BD5B-42E3-886B-45771CB3B18F@netflix.com>
+1 I do encourage people to read the "tussle" paper: http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/Tussle%20in%20Cyberspace%20Defining%20Tomorrows%20Internet%202005's%20Internet.pdf …Mark On Jul 18, 2012, at 8:34 AM, Carsten Bormann wrote: On Jul 18, 2012, at 17:09, Tim Bray wrote: Privacy is good Ah, nice, another textbook example for Protocol Design 101 is in the process of being made. To the people who want "mandatory encryption" because "privacy is good": You are designing a mechanism (here: HTTP 2.0). If you happen to like a certain policy (here: good privacy) today, you may be tempted to cripple the mechanism so it only "allows" that policy. Unless the policy comes with zero cost and is universally accepted, this sets you up for failure: 1) People who don't like your favorite policy will not use your mechanism. Worse, rational people who know that their potential peers might not like the policy will not use your mechanism. And rational people who know that there are the second kind of people will not use it either, and so on. The transitive closure is empty, but for a few zealots. 2) You may (read: will) find out later that you didn't think of the use cases for the mechanism where the policy is useless or actively hurts. If you don't understand how this works, it is nicely documented in Dave Clark et al.'s famous "tussle" paper. As a general rule, mechanisms MUST be neutral to the outcome of tussles. Design for choice. (Now there are exceptions to this rules, where a mechanism is actually being designed for a new applications space that is properly delimited by the applicability of the policy. Creating a putative replacement for a protocol as ubiquitous as HTTP is NOT this case.) That'll be your lecture for the day :-) Now the assignment: What we really should be working on is removing the obstacles we have today for widely deploying privacy-enhancing mechanisms. (Hint for solving this assignment: Designing an NG protocol with "mandatory encryption" is not helping in this at all.) Grüße, Carsten
Received on Wednesday, 18 July 2012 16:24:08 UTC