How much information needs to be in the unprotected envelope? Because one
of the benefits of transport-level security is that a snooper, for example
a government tracking dissidents, knows little/nothing about my traffic
aside from the routing. Not a rhetorical question. -Tim
On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 10:37 AM, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>wrote:
> In message <
> CAMm+Lwgr1cnM3-iz_quKhN9N_dS1d6qdv26kSvKZ+T_Hr9L+hw@mail.gmail.com>
> , Phillip Hallam-Baker writes:
>
> >5a) The TLS-HTTP gap
> >
> >Now as far as HTTP is concerned, headers have security implications
> >and so HTTP is not going to be acceptably secure without either
> >transport layer or packet layer security.
>
> I disagree.
>
> What HTTP lacks is a clear distinction between "envelope" and "body"
> the way SMTP and NNTP have it.
>
> HTTP/2.0 would enable a lot more sites to run with cryptographic
> security, if there were an unprotected envelope for load-balancers
> to act on.
>
> I also think it should be possible to mix protected and unprotected
> requests on the same TCP session.
>
> --
> Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
> phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956
> FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
> Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
>
>