Re: Denial of Service using invalid Content-Length header

In message <20110620163813.GA12762@1wt.eu>, Willy Tarreau writes:

>I would add that the *first* protection obviously is to have the
>server correctly implement timeouts, because if it is sensible to
>this attack, it's also sensible to simple client failure.

There is no possible timeout value which will both serve slow clients
in bad connectivity (iPhone4 ?) and prevent DoS attacks.


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Received on Monday, 20 June 2011 17:04:05 UTC