- From: Eric J. Bowman <eric@bisonsystems.net>
- Date: Sun, 17 Oct 2010 23:00:43 -0600
- To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- Cc: Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>, Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com>, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>, "William Chan (ιζΊζ)" <willchan@chromium.org>, "Roy T. Fielding" <fielding@gbiv.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Mark Nottingham wrote: > > > We can't simply break formerly-conforming implementations. > > We can if it's a security issue. > The security issue in question is "HTTP request smuggling" which is an attack vector which always takes the form of a malicious request from a user-agent. All it is the other way around, is a broken server putting itself at risk. There's no justification for a MUST even if there is consensus for it. I thought the consensus the WG was after, was whether or not to discard all but the first C-L or the last C-L. The current proposed language says read to connection close, instead. This makes loads of sense to me, instead of MUST fail hard based on what concern, exactly? -Eric
Received on Monday, 18 October 2010 05:01:22 UTC