- From: Dave Kristol <dmk@research.bell-labs.com>
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 1998 15:25:33 -0400 (EDT)
- To: http-wg@hplb.hpl.hp.com
If a server permits users to select their own passwords, then the threat is not only illicit access to documents on the server but also illicit access to the accounts of all users who have chosen to use their account password. If users are allowed to choose their own password that also means the server must maintain files containing the (presumably encrypted) passwords. Many of these may be the account passwords of users perhaps at distant sites. The owner or administrator of such a system could conceivably incur liability if this information is not maintained in a secure fashion. This paragraph surprises me a little. It seems to me that if I choose as a password some kind of account password, then the threat is only to me and all the accounts that share the password. I don't see how this allows "illicit access to the accounts of all users who have chosen to use their account password." If an adversary grabs my password, how does that open a risk to other users? I think what was meant here is said better and more succinctly in Section 4.4: The greatest threat to the type of transactions for which these protocols are used is network snooping. This kind of transaction might involve, for example, online access to a database whose use is restricted to paying subscribers. With Basic authentication an eavesdropper can obtain the password of the user. This not only permits him to access anything in the database, but, often worse, will permit access to anything else the user protects with the same password. Dave Kristol
Received on Thursday, 20 August 1998 12:27:58 UTC