RE: Some comments on Digest Auth

There are authentication algorithms that get rid of plain-text and that
still allow a recovered password to be used against other systems. (Digest
would be one if it didn't mix the realm name into the key used to compute
the response. I wouldn't be suprised if that weren't accidental -- the CRAM
MD5 protocol being used in POP3 and other mail protocols does not have that

So, I'm not complaining about the current digest spec -- I just don't want
the criterion to be "it's not plaintext, so it's OK".

The following criteria are fine by me:
1. Recovery of the password on one system doesn't allow its use on another
2. Replay attacks are limited to a reasonably small time window, and
implementations can practically make it quite small.
3. Brute force attack is infeasible on well chosen passwords.

Received on Wednesday, 21 January 1998 11:13:35 UTC