- From: Dave Kristol <dmk@research.bell-labs.com>
- Date: Mon, 19 Jan 98 14:13:24 EST
- To: yarong@microsoft.com
- Cc: http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com
Yaron Goland <yarong@microsoft.com> wrote: > ASSUMPTION: Avoiding replay attacks is important enough to most implementers > that either the standard will require or implementers will voluntarily > refuse to accept the same nonce twice. > > GOAL OF THIS MESSAGE: To demonstrates that the current digest auth > mechanism, from the point of view of performance in situations where we wish > to prevent replay attacks, is unacceptably sub-optimal. Ah, excellent that you set those forth, because I disagree with the assumption. The purpose of Digest is to replace Basic, with its cleartext passwords. Basic is already subject to replay attacks. Digest should be no more susceptible, and it isn't more susceptible. By clever choice of time-limited nonces, it can easily be less so. But it isn't perfect. We've known that for a long time. So let me hark back to the discussion of a few weeks ago. Let's not try to make Digest do something it was not intended to do. Let's hold replay-proof Digest for digest-ng discussions. Dave Kristol
Received on Monday, 19 January 1998 11:15:25 UTC