- From: John Franks <john@math.nwu.edu>
- Date: Mon, 26 Feb 1996 17:05:41 -0600 (CST)
- To: hallam@w3.org
- Cc: Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>, http-wg%cuckoo.hpl.hp.com@hplb.hpl.hp.com
On Mon, 26 Feb 1996 hallam@w3.org wrote: > A trick I introduced into SEA was to always apply a random mask to > each shared secret on each transaction. This is equivalent to the > nonce "increment" idea but its essentially a replacement for challenge > response. > > The client sends to the server KD(key | mask, Date, URI) where mask > is a random value chosen by the client. The server must then check to > ensure that the value of mask is not re-used within a time-frame > defined about date by the server. > This is a very good idea, but I agree with what you say below that we should perhaps wait for WRAPPED transactions to "achieve perfection." One advantage it has over incrementing nonces is that I worry a little about generating a whole sequences of digests on data which has a byte incremented each time. Does anyone know if MD5 is vulnerable given this kind of data? > > I think that we should not try to achieve perfection on digest auth > since we will be able to do much much more with WRAPPED transactions. > I see digest as a drop in replacement for BASIC. This is why I was > prepared to see the compromises involved in its design. My original > suggestion _did_ wrap the message and Jeff objected (rightly) that > it was no longer a direct BASIC replacement. > I agree completely! John Franks Dept of Math. Northwestern University john@math.nwu.edu
Received on Monday, 26 February 1996 15:10:53 UTC