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RE: KeyInfo Extensibility poll

From: Brian LaMacchia <bal@microsoft.com>
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2001 14:55:38 -0800
Message-ID: <0C682B70CE37BC4EADED9D375809768A0D050E@red-msg-04.redmond.corp.microsoft.com>
To: "'Carl Wallace'" <cwallace@erols.com>
Cc: w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org, "'merlin'" <merlin@baltimore.ie>, "'Donald E. Eastlake 3rd'" <lde008@dma.isg.mot.com>
[Carl wrote...]
>How can we avoid having option 1?  If we only permit option 2 or 3 then we
>are assuming that all future extensions are going to be related to one of
>the types we have defined.  The question is whether to support option 2 or
3
>in addition to option 1.  Since processing for option 1 must exist, i.e. we
>must be able to discard children of KeyInfo we don't understand, why
clutter
>the model with similar processing one layer down?

You're correct that we cannot avoid option 1, and there's never been any
serious discussion of that.  The issue is whether we're creating a system
that will have known backward-compatibility problems in it.  I believe
Option 1 guarantees this.

>One of the problems with option 2 with regard to the required KeyValue is
>that the contents of KeyValue can be completely replaced by custom content.
>This renders the interoperability intent of KeyValue moot.

I don't understand this comment.  First, none of the options under
discussion have any bearing on KeyValue.  Second, as support for DSAKeyValue
is required; DSA is the only guaranteed interoperable structure.  

>Option 1 does not impose a "fixed, non-extensible scheme".  It simply
allows
>us to define what we believe are reasonable structures that may be used in
>the interim, before other WGs define alternative structures, or beyond, if
>they serve an applications needs.  If someone wants to use an alternative
or
>custom structure they can, as a child of KeyInfo.  I'm puzzled by the need
>for "extensibility everywhere".  Why must all of the structures be
>extensible or all of the structures absent?  This seems like a drastic
>assessment.

Option 1 most certainly does create a fixed schema for X509Data, SPKIData
and PGPData.  As Don wrote:

	(1) Prohibit any elements, other than what we define in our
namespace,
	inside SPKIData, X509Data, and PGPData.

>Options 2 and 3 provide the ability to decorate the primitive types we
>define.  For an application that does not understand one of these
adornments
>what is the proper course of action?  Should it discard the entire element
>or only the adornment?  

You drop the "adornment" on the floor, assuming it is an immediate child of
the data type (e.g. X509Data).  That's always guaranteed to be OK in our
model, at least as we now have the data types defined.  In each of the three
datatypes under discussion (X509, PGP, SPKI), we have defined multiple
subelements for carrying related data, but we have never explicitly required
any sort of element-presence relationship among sibling children of
X509Data/PGPData/SPKIData.  (We *have* defined such relationships one level
down, e.g., X509IssuerSerial, but none of the extensibility options under
discussion would impact that.)

>How do new, custom elements color the meaning of the
>DSIG defined elements or vice-versa?  

They don't, by definition.  They can't, in fact.  Remember, *everything*
contained within KeyInfo is optional; there is no way that any particular
piece of evidence contained within a KeyInfo blob can change the data
contained within another piece of evidence within KeyInfo.  (Of course, the
policy management system may choose to view two pieces of KeyInfo as in
conflict under its particular policy and take some action, but that's its
perogative.)

>Options 2 and 3 beg for criticality flags and no one wants that.  

Again, I don't see how this can possibly be true, given the definition of
KeyInfo that we've been working with since the beginning.

>Even if criticality flags are not explicitly
>present, their behavior is implicit if we define a scheme to permit
>ignorable content in the primitive types and "critical" content in an
option
>1 style extension.  When you move material to an option 1 style extension
>you lose the relationship to the DSIG structure, which is presumably the
>goal.  

By definition, no content in an Option 1 extension can be per se "critical".
The loss of relationship when moving data to a new subelement of KeyInfo is
exactly what creates backward- and forward-compatibility problems.  A V1
client has no way to know that your new data type/subelement of KeyInfo
contains the equivalent of the X509Data info it needs.  V2 clients will be
forced to include both old & new data types, thus bloating KeyInfo.

>Further how do we relate new elements to DSIG elements in a
>structure.  Take X509Data as an example.  This structure currently permits
a
>dizzying array of names, serial numbers, certs and crls that may identify
>the signer or a CA from one of multiple paths.  If a new element is added,
>how does an application know which sibling it relates to?  

I don't understand your question here.  Any new child of X509Data, which is
all we're talking about here, would "live" at the same level as the other
permissable X509Data children.  Their relationship would be the same; they
all "relate" to a particular subject key.

>Everyone acknowledges there are issues with the X.509 extension mechanism:
>criticality flags, interoperability woes, etc.  Imagine if in addition to
>custom extensions applications could alter, replace or add to the content
of
>basicConstraints or other X.509 defined extensions.  That is what options 2
>and 3 propose to do for DSIG.  

No, they do not.  Your comment here illustrates a misconception about the
role of KeyInfo elements in DSIG, which I think is the root cause of all
this confusion.  In your X.509 example, extensions explicitly modify the
meaning of the signed statement contained within a certificate.  You are
correct that allowing clients to arbitrarily extend/change the meaning of
extensions and add new extensions destroys any interoperability on the
*meaning* of a particular signed statement (cert).  Of course, this is
exactly where PKIX Part 1 finds itself now: any extension has the ability to
completely change the meaning of the other extensions, and there's no
definition of what it means to "understand" an extension, thus any extension
potentially throws interop out the window.

But that's not the case in XMLDSIG, because nothing in KeyInfo can, in any
way, change the meaning of the signature.  Just to be perfectly clear let me
restate that: no element or subelement of KeyInfo *ever* has impact on the
meaning of a digital signature.  By definition.  Period.  That's why it is
*always* OK to remove any all elements of KeyInfo from a signature block
(absent, of course, an explicit Reference to the KeyInfo element or
something like that which would break the signature).

>The real question may be do we want to define
>an extensibility mechanism for relating elements from DSIG structures to
new
>content at this point in time?  I think the ability to add children under
>KeyInfo should be a sufficient extensibility mechanism for this version of
>DSIG, if not beyond.

Except that our past (and current!) experience with X509Data argues
otherwise.  Without an extensibility mechanism in X509Data we are condemned
to reconciliation problems between "our" X509Data and the PKIX:X509Data that
will surely be specified in the future.

					--bal
Received on Monday, 29 January 2001 17:16:46 GMT

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