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Re: Omitting Location and Transforms from SignedInfo

From: Marc Branchaud <marcnarc@xcert.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1999 10:46:51 -0800
Message-ID: <3832F81B.ADDCDADF@xcert.com>
To: DSig Group <w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org>

I _really_ think the last option is the right direction:

"Joseph M. Reagle Jr." wrote:
> 
> [ snip ]
>
> 5. Permit people to move the dereferencing/transformation outside SignedInfo
> (The Target Reference="..." means go to that reference to figure out how to
> derefence/transform the content.):
> 
> <!-- This SignedInfo referenced one object which is decoded,
>      canonicalized, deriving the content IS NOT bound to the signature -->
> 
>    <SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod="&dsig;/xml-c14n"
>                SignatureMethod="&dsig;/dsaWithSHA-1"/>
>       <Object Name="2">
>          <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue>
>          <Target Reference="4"/>
>       </Object>
>    </SignedInfo>
>    ...
>    <Object ID="4">
>       <Target URI="http://www.mypage.com/hello.base64"/>
>       <Transforms>
>          <Decode Algorith="&dsig;/base64"/>
>          <Transform Algorithm="&dsig;/xml"/>
>          <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue>
>       </Transforms>
>    </Object>
> 

I would suggest moving the transforms inside the signature, though.  The
digest inside the signature lets you ensure that you're dealing with the
right object (post-transformation, which is why the transforms have to be
signed), but the URI outside the signature can change arbitrarily.  As long
as the URI retrieves an object that can be transformed as dictated and
digested to match the signed digest, then things are happy.

The issue I see with signing the transforms is that some might interpret that
to mean the transformation must be blindly applied.  This needn't be the
case, at least not for all transforms.  base64 encoding is a good example
here.  It's easy to tell whether something is in base64.  If it isn't, don't
try to base64-decode it!  This basically makes the transforms optional.  In
the limit, you can theoretically wind up with a set of transforms, every
combination of which may need to be tried on the object before its digest
matches the signed digest.  In practice, I doubt that there will ever be (a)
a large set of transforms (i.e. > 2) and (b) a set of transforms so baroque
that the right combination has to be discovered through an exhaustive search.

Now the question might arise: If the transforms are optional, why sign them
at all?  The reason is to restrict the possible set of transformations. 
While in the end the signer doesn't really have any control over the
verifiying software, by signing the transforms at least the signer gets to
say "If you do anything other than one of these things to the object, then
you accept my signature at your own risk."  The issue is that you want to
prevent some evil transform from creating an object that has a falsely
matching digest.

So I suggest that this unsigned-URI/signed-transforms method be adopted,
where the transforms are interpreted as "here are some things you may have to
do to the object before it can be properly digested".  In the end, that list
of transforms will be "here are the things I [the signer] had to do to the
object when I (using whatever method) retrieved it for signing".

		Marc

+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 Marc Branchaud                                  \/
 Chief PKI Architect                             /\CERT INTERNATIONAL INC.
 marcnarc@xcert.com        PKI References page:              www.xcert.com
 604-640-6227          www.xcert.com/~marcnarc/PKI/
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  PGP key fingerprint:  60 11 4B 9D 4E E5 2F 47  BD C5 C2 BF 26 DF 5A E1
Received on Wednesday, 17 November 1999 12:36:40 GMT

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