W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org > October to December 1999

RE: Omitting Location and Transforms from SignedInfo

From: Joseph M. Reagle Jr. <reagle@w3.org>
Date: Wed, 17 Nov 1999 09:44:01 -0500
Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.19991117094401.0092d4a0@localhost>
To: "John Boyer" <jboyer@uwi.com>
Cc: "Greg Whitehead" <gwhitehead@signio.com>, "DSig Group" <w3c-ietf-xmldsig@w3.org>
At 09:54 99/11/12 -0800, John Boyer wrote:
 >This is quite problematic.  Our core processing rules state that we verify
 >SignedInfo, then we verify the digest values of the ObjectReferences.  HOW
 >IS CORE BEHAVIOR GOING TO DO THIS IF CORE BEHAVIOR DOESN'T KNOW 
 >HOW TO
 >RETRIEVE THE DATA?

Just wanted to comment that I think this core behavior was a mistake. We've
inextricably link the idea of resource validation (does the content when
dereferenced at a URI and transformed appropriately) with signature
validation (does the signed blob (SignInfo) when plugged into the specified
digest and signature method with a key result in a SignatureValue.) We
specified this core resource validation behaviour because people wanted to
ensure the signature was over the actual content. We did this because we
only allowed references and not the actual content. Consequently to force
signature validation of the actual content we had to (1) include signer
created validation rules in the ObjectReferences or (2) make that a default
behaviour of SignedInfo. I didn't like (1) because I don't think we our
trust model is well thought out; unfortunately (2) has led to a string of
design decisions that involves us in resource resolution problems which are
just as nasty ...

Going back to the simple signature meaning, the signature provides
integrity, authentication, and non-repudiability over some bucket of bytes.
The main reason we defined something called SignedInfo is because we needed
a bucket and a place to include C14N and Signature Method for security
purposes.

I see two main requirements people have:

R1. Force validation over critical content (presently mandated as resource
validation core behaviour.)
R2. Do not force assertions of dereferencing/transforming the content to be
bound to the signature.

I see the following options:
1. Keep status quo and use a URI that will properly dereference and
transform the target without including that info in the signature.
2. Permit transforms over SignedInfo. (Doesn't seem to be well liked.)
3. Introduce "omit" tags in the SignedInfo (No we have two inconsistent ways
of transforming content, previous discussion on this topic also is relevant.)
4. Permit people to sign content directly.

<!-- This SignedInfo includes the actual object which is processed via the
     null canonicalization -->

   <SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod="http://www.w3.org/.../xml-c14n"
               SignatureMethod="&dsig;dsaWithSHA-1"/>
      <Object ID="1">
         <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue> 
         <Transforms IDREF="3"
            <Transform Algorithm="&dsig;/xml"/> 
         </Transforms>
         <Inline ID="3">
            <name xmlns="http://www.imc.org/vcard">
               <first>Joseph</first>
               <last>Reagle</last>
            </name>
         <Inline>
      </Object>
   </SignedInfo>

(Or they can still sign things remotely.)

<!-- This SignedInfo referenced one object which is decoded,
     canonicalized, deriving the content IS bound to the signature.-->

   <SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod="&dsig;/xml-c14n"
               SignatureMethod="&dsig;/dsaWithSHA-1"/>
      <Object ID="2">
         <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue> 
         <Transforms>
            <Decode Algorith="&dsig;/base64"/>
            <Transform Algorithm="&dsig;/xslt"/> 
         </Transforms>
         <Target URI="http://www.mypage.com/hello.base64"/>
      </Object>
   </SignedInfo>

5. Permit people to move the dereferencing/transformation outside SignedInfo
(The Target Reference="..." means go to that reference to figure out how to
derefence/transform the content.):

<!-- This SignedInfo referenced one object which is decoded,
     canonicalized, deriving the content IS NOT bound to the signature -->

   <SignedInfo CanonicalizationMethod="&dsig;/xml-c14n"
               SignatureMethod="&dsig;/dsaWithSHA-1"/>
      <Object Name="2">
         <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue> 
         <Target Reference="4"/>
      </Object>
   </SignedInfo>
   ...
   <Object ID="4">
      <Target URI="http://www.mypage.com/hello.base64"/>
      <Transforms>
         <Decode Algorith="&dsig;/base64"/>
         <Transform Algorithm="&dsig;/xml"/> 
         <DigestValue Algorithm="&dsig;sha1"/>a23bcd43</DigestValue> 
      </Transforms>
   </Object>


Did I miss anything or some other option?

_________________________________________________________
Joseph Reagle Jr.   
Policy Analyst           mailto:reagle@w3.org
XML-Signature Co-Chair   http://www.w3.org/People/Reagle/
Received on Wednesday, 17 November 1999 09:44:18 GMT

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