W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webcrypto@w3.org > October 2012

Re: Usefulness of WebCrypto API

From: Seetharama Rao Durbha <S.Durbha@cablelabs.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2012 10:22:00 -0600
To: Mountie Lee <mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
CC: Vijay Bharadwaj <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, David Dahl <ddahl@mozilla.com>, Emily Stark <estark@mit.edu>, Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.GALINDO@gemalto.com>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Message-ID: <CC99A8DF.7107%s.durbha@cablelabs.com>
As Vijay originally said, we probably cannot escape answering this question around trusted JS.

As I was thinking about it, the API can fall into two categories –

 1.  One dealing with complete in-memory crypto operations - RNG, key derivation/creation, encryption/decryption/signing,etc. all done within browser's memory
 2.  Another dealing with crypto operations on 'external' devices or storing/retrieving key in/from external devices/storage (including browser storage)

The later ones require the JS to be downloaded using SSL. The former ones do not require JS to be downloaded using SSL.

Can we recognize this in our API? That is, some parts of the API do not require JS to be trusted, and other parts do?

So, the trust models we support will be

 1.  In-memory crypto operations – NONE
 2.  Device/Storage operations – user trusts the browser application he/she is using; browser trusts the JS invoking the API; (Of course, browser trusts the platform and vice versa :) -  hoping both browser and platform are not susceptible to malware )

I know that this could be more complicated than the above paragraph, but just wanted to put it out there.

Thanks,
Seetharama


On 10/8/12 7:12 PM, "Mountie Lee" <mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr<mailto:mountie.lee@mw2.or.kr>> wrote:

Hi.
for this issue, I think it is important.

we need consensus for securing JS codes.

Harry's opinion "ability to write new secure protocols in JS" is one of good consideration.

in details

Signed JS (http://www.w3.org/2012/webcrypto/wiki/Use_Cases#Signed_web_applications) is already listed in our UseCase.
to generate and verify JS, generating JS code hash is also required.

can these features be focused more?

regards
mountie.


On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:51 AM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org<mailto:hhalpin@w3.org>> wrote:
On 10/08/2012 09:22 PM, Vijay Bharadwaj wrote:

>  Then, what threat model does crypto in JA make sense for at all? Obviously, when there's some lack of trust on the server *or* connection to the server that can be ameliorated by public key crypto.

Harry asked the above on a different email thread. This is an important question. But first we should be precise about what we’re asking. WebCrypto is not (only) about “crypto in JS”. It is about giving JS access to the crypto capabilities of the underlying platform. This includes cases in which the actual crypto is done elsewhere such as in a smart card.

So when does it make sense to give JS access to the platform’s crypto capabilities? In my mind, there are a few possible answers.

It makes sense when one wants a trusted piece of JS in a trusted UA to interact with a less trusted data store. This is the Facebook use case. It is also David’s cloud storage use case if the script is retrieved from somewhere other than the server that keeps the data.

It makes sense when one wants a trusted piece of JS in a trusted UA to be able to interoperate with a server using an existing protocol (e.g. sign requests to access-controlled REST APIs, JimD’s use cases on authenticating to government services).

It makes sense when a server wants to deliver JS that uses a trusted piece of pre-provisioned crypto hardware to establish end-to-end trust independent of the UA (e.g. using a smart dongle for online banking, some of the Netflix use cases).

There may be others, and I’d love to hear what others think.

It’s important to note that the “trusted UA” assumption is not as outlandish as it might seem at first; as Ryan points out on other threads, we routinely make an assumption that the OS is trusted when talking about native apps. One does not argue that including crypto APIs in operating systems is futile just because malware and rootkits exist. Many methods exist to improve the trust in the UA, including the use of non-browser JS implementations. One could also argue that various crypto primitives – notably hash and RNG – are only meaningful if one accepts this assumption.

I agree with all the above, and thanks for listing them out, as I think they are all quite valid.  Again, most of the critiques we've gotten on the API are about not having trust in the JS at all, yet in general, I would maintain that arguments about server's being compromised are similar to arguments over rootkits on the OS level - its just XSS is generally easier than rootkits.

I guess what some developers want is:

1) ability to write new secure protocols in JS for use with WebApps with functions such as digital signatures . This would be very useful for a whole range of functions involving multiple servers besides the same-origin, such as OpenID Connect flows where one passes a signed token from a browser to identity provider, who then can pass that to a relying party in order to access personal data.

2) Developers want the crypto API to be a silver bullet for security as they assume access to "crypto functions = must be secure", but of course in reality there's quite a few more bases to be covered. Off the top of my head,  the developer should use CSP combined with HSTS/Cert Transparency/pinning for TLS (anything missing here?).  That's about as close as we're going to get to allowing them to creating secure protocols in a reasonable manner for WebApps.

Also, its unclear if the server and client should be considered *one* application, as is traditional in web-apps. We have not yet the spec stable enough where we can have a use-case where  the user can have a private key, store it, but not let secret key material be arbitrarily replaced by key material from the same-origin. I'd personally like to see that as a possibility, as that would enable use-cases where the server might be not be entirely trusted.

   cheers,
       harry




Since this question seems to keep coming up in feedback, maybe we should develop a position on it as a group. Does anyone else have any thoughts on the matter?






--
Mountie Lee

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Tel : +82 2 2140 2700
E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net<mailto:mountie@paygate.net>


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Received on Tuesday, 9 October 2012 16:22:48 GMT

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