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Re: Secure Chrome (and secure browsing mode)

From: Mary Ellen Zurko <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2006 07:57:20 -0400
To: Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
Cc: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Message-ID: <OFFA5DFA8F.7E817995-ON8525718E.004136CC-8525718E.0041B2F2@notesdev.ibm.com>
> The things that I'd think would be most useful to do (doing in
> the sense of having a working group about them) in order to
> meet the goal of helping vigilant ("suspicious", whatever we
> call them) users:
> 
> - Define a baseline set of security context information that
>   will be presented consistently, across browsers, e.g., "pick
>   these elements from your X.509 certs", "add that information
>   from whateversecurityprotocolcomesnext";
> - define best practices for how to present them nicely,
>   non-scarily and usably;
> - define requirements that list precisely what browsers should
>   not let content do to user interface elements, in particular
>   those that are used to present security relevant context.
> 
> Comments welcome.

As a set, this only makes sense if the security context information can be 
displayed non-spoofably. By that I mean a decent visual indicator when 
they're "different" from what you expect, not expecting the user to deal 
with character sets or logos that look the same but "are not". That could 
be done with browser history. There might be other ways. So I would insert 
"non-spoofably" in the middle bullet. 

The security/crypto fixes to sharing the same password and/or PII with any 
site have the biggest impact potential, but are probably slightly longer 
term and more sweeping than what you're trying to target. 

It's my personal belief that per-site personalization is likely to fall to 
the same reuse, homogeniety, and scaling issues that hit passwords and 
other information, if they were successful. I'd use my favorite picture of 
my kitty on all sites, even random evil sites trying to get that 
information from me in a follow up spoof. And oddly enough, the users I've 
talked to "in the wild" don't get the whole personalization as site 
authentication thing. But these opinions are not backed by any rigorous 
data.
        Mez
Received on Thursday, 15 June 2006 11:57:29 UTC

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