W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-usable-authentication@w3.org > June 2006

Re: Secure Chrome (and secure browsing mode)

From: George Staikos <staikos@kde.org>
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2006 00:55:02 -0400
Cc: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
To: "Undisclosed.Recipients": ;
Message-Id: <200606150055.02364.staikos@kde.org>

On Monday 12 June 2006 09:10, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> Let's remember that this is not break once run anywhere, we are not doing
> drm.
>
> We are not protecting a single unique asset. This is a percentages game.
> Even if we only protect the vigilant that is a success.
>
> We are not trying to prevent phishing here, I think the WARP bof at the
> ietf is also misnamed, we are not even necessarily aiming to reduce
> phishing with this single change by itself.
>
> What we are trying to do is to provide one piece of an infrastructure which
> together helps to reduce successful attacks.

  Excellent points.  I also realized that some of us are talking about 
different things here.  Some of us are talking about protecting users, others 
are talking about preventing successful phishes.  I think they're both 
excellent goals, and are not identical.  We should make it hard to phish, and 
that will make it hard to harm users.  We should attempt to protect users, at 
least the most vigilant to start, and that will make it hard to phish them.  
They are complementary things but may require slightly different approaches.  
Blacklists don't make it hard to phish, just annoying.  They do go a long way 
toward protecting users though.  On the other hand, closing software security 
holes doesn't directly protect all users, but it does make it harder to phish 
since there are fewer vectors and probably more tedious ones left.  We need 
to tackle both of these things, and find effective ways to do it, especially 
without confusing the two too much.

-- 
George Staikos
KDE Developer				http://www.kde.org/
Staikos Computing Services Inc.		http://www.staikos.net/
Received on Thursday, 15 June 2006 04:52:59 UTC

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