W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-tracking@w3.org > January 2014

ISSUE-241 - Signals for internal / external usage of site elements (the signals formerly called "1" and "3")

From: Ninja Marnau <ninja@w3.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 22:27:35 +0100
Message-ID: <52E037C7.4020408@w3.org>
To: public-tracking@w3.org
I created a wiki page for ISSUE-241: 
https://www.w3.org/wiki/Privacy/TPWG/Proposals_on_elements_for_1and3_party_use

Currently it lists Mike's and Nick's proposal. Please feel encouraged to 
add further text proposals as the chairs will decide within the next two 
weeks whether to proceed to Call for Objections.

Ninja

Am 18.01.14 21:14, schrieb Mike O'Neill:
> Hi Matthias,
>
> Here is my text suggestion.
>
> Tracking Status Value
>
> A tracking status value (TSV) is a short notation for communicating how a
> designated resource conforms to the tracking protection protocol, as defined
> by this document and [TRACKING-COMPLIANCE]. For a site-wide tracking status
> resource, the designated resource to which the tracking status applies is
> any resource on the same origin server. For a Tk response header field, the
> corresponding request target is the designated resource and remains so for
> any subsequent request-specific tracking status resource referred to by that
> field. A Tracking Status Value of "0" means that the origin server is
> tracking as defined in this document. A TSV of "1" means that the user is
> not being tracked. Any other value, or if the TSV is not present, indicates
> that the origin server may be tracking. Other values MAY be described in the
> document referenced by the URI in the policy property of the Tracking Status
> Resource.
>
> TSV    =  "1"                  ; the origin server is not tracking
>             /  "0"	         ; The origin server is tracking
>            / ALPHA/DIGIT   ; the origin server may be tracking, and this
> value may be described in the policy resource
>         
> Justification.
>
> The DNT protocol is supposed to be a simple way for a user to express their
> general preference on tracking and all this response element does is over
> complicate that. It is of no practical use other than to obscure the issue
> and will anyway probably be ignored by user-agents. A user simply requires
> to know if their request not to be tracked is being honoured and having
> upward of 9 possible values of the TSV convey very little to them. A 1 or 0
> response maps simply to the DNT header values and will be easier for users
> to understand.
>
> Mike
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Matthias Schunter (Intel Corporation) [mailto:mts-std@schunter.org]
>> Sent: 16 January 2014 20:00
>> To: public-tracking@w3.org
>> Subject: Re: Signals for internal / external usage of site elements (the
> signals
>> formerly called "1" and "3")
>>
>> Hi Folks,
>>
>> I had the impression that some people may be interested in retaining
>> these signals in the TPE.
>> If this is the case, I would like to solicit text proposals...
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>    matthias
>>
>> Am 08.01.2014 09:14, schrieb Roy T. Fielding:
>>> On Jan 7, 2014, at 9:55 PM, Mike O'Neill wrote:
>>>
>>>> Anyway, its removal in the first place was a chairs/editors decision,
> never
>> requested by the rest of us.
>>> First, the editors' draft doesn't have it because I don't know of any
> way to
>> express a first/third party design distinction without some notion of the
>> constraints on first vs third (i.e., that's 100% compliance).
>>> Second, there have been dozens of requests to avoid importing
> definitions into
>> TPE that are not necessary to express the protocol.  Clearly, these
> definitions
>> are right on the borderline -- the distinctions that this group has made
> regarding
>> first and third parties are not discernible by either side of the
> connection, so it is
>> extremely unlikely that any technical implementations of those ownership
>> concepts will be correct. They are regulatory concerns, not technical
> concerns.
>>> Hence, if at all possible, my preference is to avoid using these terms
> within the
>> protocol exchange.  This does not prevent them from being used to guide or
>> explain compliance.
>>>> My problem was solely with overloading the definition of tracking with
> the
>> ambiguous multiple contexts limitation, which I still feel is
> inappropriate in the
>> TPE.
>>> That is both incorrect and irrelevant to this discussion.  One of the
> nice
>>> things about closed issues is that we aren't allowed to discuss them
> again
>>> without new information.
>>>
>>>> Mike
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: David Singer [mailto:singer@apple.com]
>>>>> Sent: 08 January 2014 00:10
>>>>> To: Matthias Schunter (Intel Corporation)
>>>>> Cc: Mike O'Neill; Tracking Protection Working Group; Dobbs, Brooks
>>>>> Subject: Re: Signals for internal / external usage of site elements
> (the signals
>> formerly called "1" and "3")
>>>>> I think that the browser being able to tell in a uniform way whether a
> site
>> was
>>>>> designed as first party or third party, without making any statements
> about
>> what
>>>>> first party or third party rules it conforms to, is useful.
>>> I will try once again to explain the problem space.
>>>
>>> First, we aren't talking about sites.  A browser might care to know
> whether a
>> given subrequest is to the same origin, same parent domain, or to a
> resource
>> that is controlled by the same owner as the page that they intended to
> visit.
>> Unfortunately, the browser doesn't know what page the user intended to
> visit,
>> let alone who owns that page.  The initial request target is not
> necessarily a first
>> party; the first party depends on how the potential action (i.e., link)
> was
>> presented to the user, not the URI referenced in that action.  This is
> something
>> that only a user (or regulator acting as a user) can determine.
>>> The fact that the browser has been told to fetch a number of pages and
>> eventually render content within a frame on one of those pages and, as a
> result,
>> make more subrequests as instructed by an assortment of page rendering
>> choices, driven from some combination of local configuration, standard
> HTML,
>> CSS, and non-standard scripting, does not in any way inform the browser
> which
>> of those requests correspond to the intent of the user. In fact, it is
> quite possible
>> that none of them do (e.g., phishing).
>>> A browser, therefore, has no idea whether a given page ought to be first
> party,
>> let alone the elements within that page.
>>> Second, if a browser happens to think it is on a first party page and
> makes a
>> subrequest to a resource that claims to be first party, why would the user
> think
>> there might be something amiss?  Because of the domain names?  Browsers
>> don't know what parties own/control what domains.  Browsers can't see
>> common branding.  Browsers can't make any of the decisions that would
>> somehow distinguish one resource owner from another even when they are
>> operating on different domains, and there's no guarantee that two
> different
>> parties can't occupy the same domain (in fact, they often do).
>>> Finally, if by some miracle the browser does manage to distinguish one
>> resource from another as being owned by different parties, and somehow
>> manages to know which of those parties the user actually intended to
> interact
>> with, and also that this is not a case of joint first parties, then what
> is it going to
>> do?
>>> Is it going to
>>>
>>>     a) make the subrequest with DNT:1 and hope it all works out?
>>>     b) fetch the TSR for this designated resource and inspect its
>>>        info before doing (a)?
>>>     c) check the resource's reputation with some listing service?
>>>
>>> Those are the three choices.  Here are the implications:
>>>
>>>     (a) it has already decided that informing the user before they are
>>>         tracked is not desired; the 1/3 flag will not be received.
>>>
>>>     (b) the TSR will either not exist (no compliance) or contain
> sufficient
>>>         detail for the browser to make a decision based solely on whether
>>>         it trusts the identified controller -- whether or not the
> resource
>>>         is designed for first or third party use is irrelevant if the
> controller
>>>         is trusted (to somehow comply) with DNT:1, and even less relevant
> if
>>>         the controller isn't trusted.
>>>
>>>     (c) the listing service will make a decision for the browser,
> regardless
>>>         of the first or third party status.
>>>
>>>>> Even if a conformance regime is finally conceived that doesnít make or
> need
>> the
>>>>> distinction, itís not harmful for the TPE to enable signalling it for
> sites using
>> that
>>>>> regime; itís just not relevant.
>>> It is always harmful to send bytes that aren't used.  In particular, the
> 1/3
>> distinction is the main source of variance in the TSR response, which
> means it
>> effects both the likelihood of simple static implementation and the
> cacheability
>> of the TSR verification result.  If there is no 1/3 flag, then the vast
> majority of
>> servers (both first and third party) can use a single TSR for their entire
> service.
>>>>> As you say, finding a resource that presumed it was in a 1st party
> context,
>> being
>>>>> used in a 3rd party context, should be a warning flag to the browser
> that
>> maybe
>>>>> the site is not following the rules for the context it has (probably
>> unwittingly)
>>>>> been placed in.  In the current compliance document, we place much
> lighter
>>>>> constraints on 1st party than on 3rd, so there may well be a concern
> for the
>> user
>>>>> here.
>>>>>
>>>>> These flags donít link to a specific conformance regime.  I donít see
> the
>> problem
>>>>> that Mike sees, honestly, and they really help the user not to be
> 'flying
>> blindí.
>>> There has been no interest shown by browsers in presenting information
> to
>> their users, regardless of what the response might be. A user is going to
> be
>> 'flying blind', no matter how we specify the response, unless they use
> special
>> tools or extensions for discovery.  What the response does provide is a
>> statement of business practice that can be inspected by such concerned
> users,
>> advocates, and regulators independent of any specific request.
>>> In terms of verification features, it would be far more useful to active
> users for
>> a tool to obtain the TSR for all page components and color code (or graph)
> them
>> by controller/owner identification.  The user can then find the identity
> that they
>> intended to interact with, see all the other parties that are not the
> same, and
>> make their own decisions about which ones are intended and which are not.
>>> In contrast, the cost and risk of reporting how each specific resource
> has been
>> designed to operate are very real concerns for site operators.  It is
> fairly easy for
>> a data controller to say that they will turn off all tracking (i.e.,
> discard any data
>> about user activity in contexts other than their own first party contexts)
> for
>> requests with DNT:1.  It is much harder for them to consistently identify
> and
>> categorize each and every resource on an origin server.
>>> Hence, I don't think the merits of a tracking status value for 1/3 come
>> anywhere near to justifying its cost, both in terms of getting consensus
> on TPE
>> and in getting implementations of the protocol in practice.  If there is
> ever a
>> need for that information as a means of explaining compliance, then it can
> be
>> included in a qualifier along with all of the other explanations of
> compliance.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Roy T. Fielding                     <http://roy.gbiv.com/>
>>> Senior Principal Scientist, Adobe   <https://www.adobe.com/>
>>>
>>>
>
>
Received on Wednesday, 22 January 2014 21:28:01 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Friday, 3 November 2017 21:45:21 UTC