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Re: PROV-ISSUE-29 (mutual-iVP-of): can two bobs be mutually "IVP of" each other [Conceptual Model]

From: Luc Moreau <L.Moreau@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 05:27:01 +0000
To: Jim McCusker <mccusj@rpi.edu>
CC: Stian Soiland-Reyes <soiland-reyes@cs.manchester.ac.uk>, Paul Groth <p.t.groth@vu.nl>, James Cheney <jcheney@inf.ed.ac.uk>, "public-prov-wg@w3.org" <public-prov-wg@w3.org>
Message-ID: <EMEW3|55da24bdeeb4a2efd4b02e199745db07o316R508L.Moreau|ecs.soton.ac.uk|942EEFB4-F8CF-41AF-91AB-6159B7D9FF44@ecs.soton.ac.uk>
Jim,

Same as for Stian. Concretely, what is the implication for *our* definition.
Does it hold? Do we have transitivity?

Professor Luc Moreau
Electronics and Computer Science
University of Southampton
Southampton SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom

On 2 Apr 2012, at 01:03, "Jim McCusker" <mccusj@rpi.edu<mailto:mccusj@rpi.edu>> wrote:

One of the examples that Tim and I have been working from is FRBR item versus manifestation versus expression. Is "Moby Dick" a singular entity? How about a particular edition or translation of it? They, at some level, are talking about the same thing, and in some ways are singular things. But there are many physical exemplars of Moby Dick, and within the FRBR framework the physical aspect (Item) is disjoint from the physical pattern (Manifestation) and from the content (Expression). Saying that each level is talking about the same thing is kind of hard, because in one sense (the manifestation), one copy of a book (or file) is  the same as another, but at another level, they are different.

Jim

On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 at 7:11 PM, Stian Soiland-Reyes <soiland-reyes@cs.manchester.ac.uk<mailto:soiland-reyes@cs.manchester.ac.uk>> wrote:
On Sun, Apr 1, 2012 at 21:52, Paul Groth <p.t.groth@vu.nl<mailto:p.t.groth@vu.nl>> wrote:
> Your example is correct...but I the common thing were talking about is the
> thing in the chair,
>
> But maybe the gurus should step in

I'm not claiming to be a guru on the matter, but we've had this
discussion ( a few times!) before.

If we assume every entity only maps to one thing in the world - and
all those things are distinguishable, then we are enforcing a
particular classification of things. (that there is some "real thing"
in the end). How do we define a thing? What do you mean by "the car",
do you include the petrol or not? Well, one way is to describe it as
an entity.

Two entities could be describing the ''same thing" if the two
interpretations overlap. The now famous "Customer in chair at 6pm"
entity overlaps with the  "Woman in red dress" entity - they are
alternates of the "same thing", as they are both specializations of
the same woman, let's call her Julie. CustomerInChairAt6Pm is also a
specialization of CustomerInChair, and alternate of
CustomerInChairAt7Pm.

However they don't continue to be 'the same thing' as Julie gets up at
7pm to leave the cafe, and Bob sits down in her chair.
CustomerInChairAt6pm disappears (is *consumed* by the Leaving
activity, if you like), but Julie still wears her red dress;
JulieInRedDress lives on. The CustomerInChairAt7pm has nothing to do
with JulieInRedDress; they are not the same thing.


In this case it was the passing of time that caused the
same-thing-entities to transition to other entities which are not the
same thing.

For conceptual things this can happen in other ways, for instance,
imagine the genome sequence GATTACA is a specialization of "the human
genome sequence", which is an specialization of the actual genome
sequences from a selection of humans. However as the human genome is a
kind of idealized average, some of those humans might not have GATTACA
in their genome, and so here it would not be transitive. (I know this
is pushing it a bit, as you could rather say that the idealized
sequence is derived from the actual sequences - however you often find
derivation and specialization go hand in hand).

My signature in the end of this email is a specialization of this
email message, which is a specialization of my thoughts on this email
thread. However the signature is not a specialization of those
thoughts.

--
Stian Soiland-Reyes, myGrid team
School of Computer Science
The University of Manchester




--
Jim McCusker
Programmer Analyst
Krauthammer Lab, Pathology Informatics
Yale School of Medicine
james.mccusker@yale.edu<mailto:james.mccusker@yale.edu> | (203) 785-6330
http://krauthammerlab.med.yale.edu

PhD Student
Tetherless World Constellation
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
mccusj@cs.rpi.edu<mailto:mccusj@cs.rpi.edu>
http://tw.rpi.edu
Received on Monday, 2 April 2012 05:27:47 GMT

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